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ENGLISH JUDGES AND ROMAN JURISTS:                       
THE CIVILIAN LEARNING BEHIND ENGLAND’S        
FIRST CASE LAW 
Thomas McSweeney∗ 
This Article looks at a historical problem—the first use of case law by English 
royal justices in the thirteenth century—and makes it a starting point for thinking about 
the ways legal reasoning works in the modern common law. In the first Part of the 
Article, I show that, at its origin, the English justices’ use of decided cases as a source 
of law was inspired by the work civil and canon law scholars were doing with written 
authorities in the medieval universities. In an attempt to make the case that English law 
was on par with civil law and canon law, the justices and clerks of the royal courts 
began to treat cases as if they were the opinions of great jurists, to apply the same 
types of dialectical reasoning that were used in civil law discourse to those cases, and 
to work them into systems of authority. They used cases, as the modern common law 
does; but they used cases to create systems of the kind we usually associate with civil 
law. In the second Part of the Article, I turn to the modern common law and, using the 
methods of medieval case law as a mirror, show that the differences between civil law 
and common law reasoning are more perceived than real. American lawyers tend to 
view common law as flexible and creative, whereas they view civil law as ossified and 
hierarchical. This largely stems from the fact that common lawyers focus on the 
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Abigail Fisher, and the participants in the 2010 American Society for Legal History Conference for their 
comments on earlier versions of this Article. Translations, apart from translations from the Bracton treatise, 
are mine. For quotations to Bracton, I generally follow Samuel Thorne’s translation, with occasional 
modifications. All errors are my own. 
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judicial opinion as the place where legal reasoning takes place. By integrating other 
texts, like the student outline and the restatement—which seek to create a harmonious 
system out of judicial opinions—into the picture of common law reasoning, I show that 
common law reasoning shares quite a bit in common with civil law reasoning.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Common law and civil law are the two major competing families of law in the 
world today. It is misleading to talk about them as two unities, since each has many 
individual instantiations in various countries; but lawyers within each family share 
some basic cultural assumptions. Common law sees itself as an autochthonous 
development of an individualistic and insular English culture. Civil law sees itself as 
the direct heir to Roman law. The modern civil law’s quintessential texts are codes, 
which express the will of the people through the legislature and present the law as a 
coherent system.1 The common law’s are cases, and common lawyers are educated to 
view case law as a flexible mode of legal development that brings the weight of 
practical judicial experience to the process of legal change, in contradistinction to the 
rigidity and deductive nature of the code.2 
In this Article, I look at a historical case that collapses the cultural differences 
between common law and civil law. I show that England’s first flirtation with case law 
in the thirteenth century was not a purely insular, English development, but was 
actually inspired by medieval civil law. Cases were introduced into the education of 
clerks in the royal courts—there was no profession of lawyers yet in England—
because, to the justices and clerks of the royal courts, they looked similar to the types 
of authorities one would find in civil law texts. These justices argued from individual 
cases, as we do in modern common law discourse; but they focused on how they could 
work the individual cases into a harmonious system, a preoccupation usually associated 
with the civil law today. 
In Parts II and III, I look at the genres of judicial writing in thirteenth-century 
England. Part II focuses on the plea rolls, the administrative records of the king’s 
courts, and collections of plea roll entries that were made by justices and clerks in the 
middle decades of the century. In Part III, I turn to the treatise commonly called 
Bracton, which works those cases into a system of law. The authors of Bracton, royal 
justices themselves, thought the justices who decided the cases recorded on the plea 
rolls were important as personal authorities, and, in this respect, were not so different 
from modern common lawyers, who ascribe a great deal of authority to their judges. 
 
1. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 34–37 (2004) (discussing the French civil law system, in which 
judges see themselves as mechanically applying the code rather than making law themselves through their 
decisions).  
2. American comparativists often view civil law as overly formalist. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE 
OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIèCLE) 107 (1997) (describing the average American lawyer’s perception of the 
European legal culture as formalistic); LASSER, supra note 1, at 27–28 (attributing to the traditional American 
comparative tradition the belief that French civil judicial system is a “bastion of judicial formalism” where 
codes are applied mechanically); cf. 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 507–09 (1959) (discussing the risks 
associated with a pseudoscientific legal system). 
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These authors also placed a heavy emphasis on systematization of the law, an emphasis 
that they drew from their experience with medieval civil law.  
In Part IV, I turn to genres of legal writing in the modern common law and show 
that, although the common law’s identity comes from the judicial opinion—which 
places the judge as an individual authority at the center of legal development—
American common law also produces texts that emphasize the system over the 
individual. These texts—the student outline and the restatement of law—occupy a far 
less central space in the imagination of the common law than the case. Where the 
common law likes to think of itself as an unfolding story told by its judges, it retains, 
just beneath the surface, the civilian desire for an all-encompassing code without 
contradictions. Bracton, a text that keeps both desires on the surface level, helps us to 
model this. 
II. CASE LAW IN THIRTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 
A. Collecting Cases 
By the middle of the thirteenth century, justices and clerks in the royal courts 
were collecting records of cases from the plea rolls, their administrative records, and 
treating them as legal literature. This culture of case collecting became possible only 
after half a century of professionalization in the royal courts. The twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries are usually treated as the beginning of the English common law, although the 
term itself was not employed much at the time.3 In the second half of the twelfth 
century, coming out of two decades of civil war, Henry II instituted several new 
procedures for recovering land lost during the anarchy.4 These procedures had many of 
the elements that would become hallmarks of the common law, most importantly the 
writ to begin litigation and the jury to end it.5 Henry experimented with various ways 
of delivering justice to the counties and established travelling groups of royal justices 
called eyres—a model his grandfather, Henry I, had used before him.6 These new 
courts and procedures increased access to royal justice so that, by the time of the first 
court records, we see people from all social strata suing in the king’s courts.7 
By the second decade of the thirteenth century, the royal courts had developed a 
corps of professional justices. During the reigns of Henry’s sons Richard and John, 
 
3. Paul Brand, Law and Custom in the English Thirteenth Century Common Law, in CUSTOM: THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF A LEGAL CONCEPT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 31 (Per Andersen & Mia Münster-
Swendsen eds., 2008) (noting that what came to be known as English common law had a variety of labels in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries).  
4. See JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 
FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 126–29 (1996).  
5. See id. at 127–34 (discussing the introduction of new administrative procedures including the use of 
royal writs and recognitions by “lawful men”).  
6. Id. at 123–26; RALPH V. TURNER, THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY IN THE AGE OF GLANVILL AND BRACTON, 
c. 1176–1239, at 19–21 (1985).  
7. See HUDSON, supra note 4, at 205–06 (noting that access to the central court was likely expensive, but 
acknowledging that the royal courts heard cases from “minor men” who owned relatively small amounts of 
land).  
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three types of courts had started to take shape: a court that followed the king as he 
perambulated around his realm (the court coram rege), a court that sat more or less 
permanently at Westminster hall (the common bench), and a series of periodic judicial 
visitations of the counties (the eyres).8 Although the justices assigned to these courts 
were often great magnates or royal servants in other departments of the administration 
who spent a minority of their time sitting as justices in the courts, a few justices were 
recruited in the 1180s and 1190s who would spend virtually their entire careers as 
justices, a group whom we might call professionals.9 Each justice had at least one clerk 
who kept the justice’s plea roll, a record of the cases he had heard.10 When the justice 
was a magnate, he might bring his own personal clerk along with him when he sat in 
the courts.11 With the advent of the professional justices, though, we start to see some 
long-term clerks who specialize in working as clerks in the courts.12 Simon of 
Pattishall’s clerk, Martin of Pattishall, served his master for many years.13 When Simon 
retired from the bench in 1216, Martin was elevated to justice.14 This became a fairly 
common pattern for promotion to the bench from Martin’s elevation until the end of the 
thirteenth century.15  
It is worth pausing to note that what was happening in the king’s courts was 
separate from what was happening in the universities. Oxford University was brand 
new at the turn of the thirteenth century, but it already had many masters of law; and 
law seems to have been taught at some cathedral schools, like Ely and Exeter.16 These 
law schools did not teach the law of the king’s courts. They taught civil law—the 
Roman law found in Justinian’s sixth-century Institutes, Codex, and Digest, as 
 
8. See TURNER, supra note 6, at 65–69, 126–29.  
9. See id. at 39, 73–75 (discussing the multifarious activities of early justices and the rise of a 
professional judiciary). 
10. Id. at 215. We know much more about the clerks of the courts in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries than we do about the clerks in the period I am surveying in this Article. This is partly due 
to the fact that it was not until 1305 that clerks began to sign the plea rolls they wrote. Paul Brand, Medieval 
Legal Bureaucracy: The Clerks of the King’s Courts in the Reign of Edward I, in THE MAKING OF THE 
COMMON LAW 169, 170 (Paul Brand ed., 1992). We do not know precisely how the clerks of the early 
thirteenth century related to the justices and the courts, whether they were thought to be in royal service or in 
the service of an individual justice, or how many of them there might have been.  
11. See TURNER, supra note 6, at 215–16. 
12. See id. (profiling several career clerks who ultimately joined the judiciary).  
13. Id. at 210–11.  
14. Id. 
15. See id. at 215–16 (“Certainly [serving as a clerk] was not the only route to a judgeship, but it was 
becoming more and more common as the century progressed.”). 
16. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CANONISTS, 
CIVILIANS, AND COURTS 111, 237 (2008) (discussing the “talented group of decretists [who] were teaching 
canon law in schools at Oxford” beginning in the late twelfth century); NICHOLAS ORME, EDUCATION IN THE 
WEST OF ENGLAND, 1066–1548 52 (noting that Exeter had a vibrant cathedral school, but was losing ground to 
the universities in the early thirteenth century). The evidence that Thomas of Marlborough taught Roman law 
at Exeter in the early thirteenth century is no longer generally accepted, however. Jane E. Sayers, 
Marlborough, Thomas of (d. 1236), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY available at http://www.o 
xforddnb.com/view/article/18077. 
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reinterpreted by medieval jurists—and canon law, the law of the Church.17 The two 
laws were closely related; to obtain a degree in one, a student was required to learn 
quite a bit of the other.18 They were both taught according to the scholastic method, to 
which we will return later.19  
Even if the universities did not teach the laws of England, some of the people who 
worked in the king’s courts had university or cathedral school training in law. The 
amount of influence that Roman law and canon law exerted on the early common law 
through these schools-trained justices and royal advisors has been a major point of 
debate for legal historians.20 Although at times we do find evidence that the people who 
worked in the royal courts thought of their work as somewhat analogous to Roman and 
canon law, university training in law was not a requirement or even a usual path to a 
position in the royal courts.21 In fact, there is little direct evidence, apart from a few 
Roman legal terms in the Glanvill treatise of the 1180s, that the people who worked in 
the king’s courts thought of what they were doing as a discrete professional discourse 
called law, rather than as a type of royal administration.22 
This had changed by the 1220s. In that decade, a justice or clerk in the royal 
courts began a treatise called De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliæ (“On the Laws 
and Customs of England”), commonly called Bracton after the royal justice Henry de 
Bratton, who was once thought to have written the treatise.23 This treatise placed 
English law alongside Roman law as a complex legal system. Because of its systematic 
approach to English law, Bracton is often treated as one of the great, foundational texts 
of the common law.24 It is the largest compendium of English law we have from the 
 
17. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 16, at 248 (discussing the teaching of civil and canon law at Oxford and 
Cambridge); PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 45–47 (1999) (discussing the influence of 
Justinian’s texts on civil law).  
18. BRUNDAGE, supra note 16, at 233–34, 238; see also id. at 234 n.55 (recounting a medieval proverb: 
“Legista sine canonibus parum valet, canonista sine legibus nihil,” or, “A Romanist without canon law isn’t 
worth much and a canonist without Roman law is worth nothing at all”).  
19. Id. at 248–57. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the scholastic method.  
20. For two recent surveys of the literature on the influence of Roman law on the common law, see 
generally Anne J. Duggan, Roman, Canon, and Common Law in Twelfth-Century England: The Council of 
Northampton (1164) Re-Examined, 83 HIST. RES. 379 (2010); and Joshua C. Tate, Ownership and Possession 
in the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 280 (2006).  
21. TURNER, supra note 6, at 37–39, 150–52, 231–36.  
22. Apart from his introduction, which draws from the introduction to Justinian’s Institutes, the Glanvill 
author uses the Roman term proprietas three times, the term possessio once, and the terms crimen and 
criminalis about half-a-dozen times. RANULPH DE GLANVILL, ATTR., THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND 
CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 3–4, 6, 132, 171 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & 
trans., 1965). 
23. BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne 
trans.) (William S. Hein & Co., photo. reprint 1997) (1968–1977) (Latin text Yale Univ. Press 1942) (c. 1220–
1250) (hereinafter BRACTON).  
24. Pollock and Maitland, in their magisterial work on medieval English law, titled the chapter on the 
thirteenth century “The Age of Bracton.” 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 174 (2d ed., 1898). The literature on Bracton is 
vast. Although most of it pre-dates Samuel Thorne’s re-dating of the treatise, there is much in the literature 
that has not been superseded. For instance, CARL GÜTERBOCK, BRACTON AND HIS RELATION TO THE ROMAN 
LAW: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE ROMAN LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES (Brinton Coxe trans., Fred 
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Middle Ages, the last attempt for several centuries to put the whole of English law into 
a single text—in this case a summa, a genre of legal writing popular in the 
universities.25 More importantly for the present discussion, it contains 527 references to 
cases from the plea rolls.26 This has seemed significant to many of the people who have 
looked at the treatise. Since case law is the basis of common law culture today, cases in 
an English treatise of the thirteenth century resonate with those of us who have been 
trained in common law systems. Bracton has thus, at times, been held up as the 
beginning of the Anglo-American case law tradition. One lawyer-historian, speaking at 
a meeting of lawyers in Hong Kong, called its author (he was apparently unaware that 
it is currently thought to be the work of several authors) “the father of case law.”27  
Bracton is not the entire story when it comes to case law, though. The authors of 
that text were working within an established case-law tradition. In the 1220s and 1230s 
a coterie of justices and clerks in the royal courts took the terse and dull administrative 
documents that recorded the outcomes of cases—the plea rolls—and started reading 
them as if they contained profound statements of legal principle. They made collections 
of these case records, at least half a dozen of which existed by the middle of the 
 
B. Rothman & Co. 1979) (1866), places Bracton in the context of the development of Roman law and the ius 
commune in Europe, as a text that contributed to that development. The English-language literature on the 
treatise has tended to focus on two issues: the authors’ political theories and whether they were good 
Romanists or bad Romanists. See generally ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN 
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY 143–92 (1957); HERMANN KANTOROWICZ, BRACTONIAN PROBLEMS (1941); 
H.G. RICHARDSON, BRACTON: THE PROBLEM OF HIS TEXT (1965); SELDEN SOC., SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE 
WORKS OF BRACTON AND AZO (Frederic William Maitland ed., 1895); H. G. Richardson, Azo, Drogheda, and 
Bracton, 59 ENG. HIST. REV. 22 (1944); H.G. Richardson, Tancred, Raymond, and Bracton, 59 ENG. HIST. 
REV. 376 (1944); Brian Tierney, Bracton on Government, 38 SPECULUM 295 (1963); Paul Vinogradoff, The 
Roman Elements in Bracton’s Treatise, 32 YALE L.J. 751 (1923); George E. Woodbine, The Roman Element in 
Bracton’s De Aquirendo Rerum Dominio, 31 YALE L.J. 827 (1922).  
 In 1968, the Tulane Law Review ran a special issue on Bracton to commemorate the 700th anniversary of 
Henry de Bratton’s death. See, e.g., Mitchell Franklin, Bracton, Para-Bractons(s) and the Vicarage of the 
Roman Law, 42 TUL. L. REV. 455, 456 (discussing Bracton’s relevance to modern legal scholarship and 
describing the scope of modern “Bractonian problems” as vast). Samuel Thorne published a complete edition 
and translation of the treatise between 1968 and 1977. BRACTON, supra note 23. In his introduction to the third 
volume, Thorne argued convincingly that the major writing on the treatise dates from the 1220s and 1230s, not 
the 1250s and 1260s as previously thought, and that Henry de Bratton could not have been the author of the 
earliest parts of the treatise. Samuel E. Thorne, Translator’s Introduction to BRACTON, supra note 23, at xiii. 
The major work on Bracton since Thorne’s re-dating has been a debate between John Barton and Paul Brand 
over the dating of the treatise. Compare John L. Barton, The Mystery of Bracton, 14 J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1993), 
and John L. Barton, The Authorship of Bracton: Again, 30 J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (2009) with Paul Brand, The 
Age of Bracton, in THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: CENTENARY ESSAYS ON ‘POLLOCK AND MAITLAND’ 65 
(John Hudson ed., 1996), and Paul Brand, The Date and Authorship of Bracton: A Response, 31 J. LEGAL 
HIST. 217 (2010). 
25. The authors of Bracton call the work a summa in the introduction and also draw quite a bit of 
material from the civilian jurist Azo of Bologna’s summae on the Institutes and the Codex. 2 BRACTON, supra 
note 23, at 19, 46, 49.  
26. Thomas Joseph McSweeney, Priests of Justice: Creating Law Out of Administration in Thirteenth-
Century England 6 (July 26, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with Cornell 
University Library).  
27. T.L. Yang, Henry de Bracton: The Father of Case Law, in LAW LECTURES FOR PRACTITIONERS 211 
(1987); see also Elizabeth Phillips, Introduction to LAW LECTURES FOR PRACTITIONERS, at v.  
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century.28 Their patterns of thought were conditioned by the universities, and they 
engaged with cases in the same ways canonists and civilians engaged with their 
authorities, elevating the plea rolls from administrative records to legal literature in the 
process. By tapping into the languages of authority and legitimacy they found in the 
schools, the justices and clerks of the English king’s courts sought to turn themselves 
into jurists like the ones they found in Roman and canon law texts, and to make the 
argument that the type of administrative work they performed was different from, and 
superior to, the types of administrative work performed by other royal servants: it was 
law. 
Although our modern case law descends from a later tradition of case literature, 
the law report, there is some continuity between what these justices and clerks were 
doing and the law report tradition. Modern case law thus bears some relation to the 
civilian case law tradition of the thirteenth century. The earliest surviving examples of 
law reports date from the late 1260s and are associated with the rise of the serjeants and 
attorneys around that time—the first professional, private lawyers.29 Law reports were 
probably written by a combination of court clerks, practicing lawyers, and aspiring 
lawyers.30 Unlike the plea rolls, which were written in Latin and contained only 
indirect discourse, the law reports were usually written in French, the vernacular of the 
English elite, often contained what claimed to be verbatim quotations from the court 
proceedings, and named the justices and serjeants who were speaking.31 Also, the 
reports, unlike plea roll entries, often omitted the resolution of the case, creating an 
aesthetic of debate rather than of authority.32 The differences between these two genres 
of writing, however, have hidden the possibility that the law reports were inspired by 
the plea roll collections of the thirteenth century. Indeed, some of the early law report 
collections masquerade as plea roll collections.33 The law reports were later collected 
into year books and are essentially continuous with our modern reporters. 
The case collections made by these justices and clerks before the lawyers began to 
write their law reports have been largely neglected. This is because the history of the 
case as a literary genre in thirteenth-century England has been long-buried under the 
weight of the history of Bracton. Until the 1970s, the story of case collecting in 
thirteenth-century England was a relatively simple one: all of the existing case 
collections had been made in preparation for Bracton. In the late nineteenth century, 
the legal historian Paul Vinogradoff discovered a collection of 2,000 cases from the 
plea rolls in the British Museum.34 Shortly thereafter, Frederick William Maitland, the 
 
28. The most famous is British Library MS Add. 12269, which has been published as BRACTON’S NOTE 
BOOK (photo. reprint 1999) (F. Maitland ed., 1887). 
29. PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 63–65 (1992). 
30. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 178–79 (4th ed. 2007); see Brand, 
supra note 12, at 68–69 (discussing the use of law reports for legal training).  
31. See, e.g., 1 THE EARLIEST ENGLISH LAW REPORTS 33–34 (Paul A. Brand ed., 1996) (c. 1284) 
(providing an example of a law report of the late thirteenth century).  
32. See generally id. at 1–36. 
33. Cambridge Univ. Lib., Collection of Mixed Latin and French Law Reports, MS Dd.7.14, fols. 237v–
247v. 
34. See A Letter of Paul Vinogradoff, THE ATHENAEUM (July 19, 1884), reprinted in 1 BRACTON’S 
NOTE BOOK, supra note 28, at xvii (discussing British Museum MS Add. 12,269). 
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grandfather of common law history, produced an edition of this case collection.35 After 
finding some overlap between the cases in the treatise and those in this case collection, 
Maitland decided that it was probably made at the instruction of Henry de Bratton to 
use in selecting the cases to place in the treatise.36 He therefore dubbed the collection 
Bracton’s Note Book.37 Note Book in hand, Maitland decided to take his research one 
step further, and to go back to the plea rolls and find the original case records that were 
copied into the Note Book.38 He found that someone had sidelined some cases, written 
“volo” (“I want this”) next to others, and placed subject headings over others.39 
Maitland believed that these were the instructions Henry de Bratton had left for his 
scribes, telling them which cases to copy into the Note Book.40 The cases in Bracton, 
the Note Book, and the marked rolls all came from the same two justices—Martin of 
Pattishall and Martin’s own clerk-turned-justice, William of Ralegh. Henry de Bratton, 
who Maitland believed to be the primary author of Bracton, was, in turn, Ralegh’s 
clerk before he was a justice, and could have had access to the rolls of both Pattishall 
and Ralegh. Maitland could therefore draw a straight line from marked plea rolls, to the 
Note Book, to Bracton.41 Case collecting in thirteenth-century England was, according 
to Maitland, all part of a single project and all the work of Henry de Bratton and his 
small army of clerks.42 Case collections and marked rolls were not to be used on their 
own, but were transitional texts, designed to create a finished work and then to be cast 
aside. Maitland was humble about his assertions, though, asking at the end of his book 
that someone prove him wrong.43 
In 1977, Samuel Thorne did precisely that. In that year he published the third 
volume of his edition and translation of Bracton and argued, compellingly, that 
although Henry de Bratton probably wrote some later parts of the treatise, he could not 
have been its primary author, since most of the work for the treatise was completed in 
the 1220s and early 1230s, before Bratton had entered the royal courts.44 The treatise 
 
35. See Fredrick William Maitland, Preface to 1 BRACTON’S NOTE BOOK, supra note 28, at vii–ix 
(discussing the circumstances of Maitland’s publication). 
36. Id. § 2, at 12–13. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. § 7, at 66.  
39. Id. § 7, at 64–68. 
40. Id. § 7, at 67. 
41. Id. § 8, at 71–77. 
42. See id. § 7, at 63–64. 
43. Id. § 7, at 116–17. 
44. The primary evidence for this earlier date is the treatise’s treatment of the provisions of the council 
of Merton, which took place in 1236. Thorne, supra note 24, at xiii–xvi. The portions of the treatise that 
discuss those provisions all appear to be in later additions or amendments to the primary text. Id. The first 
chapter of the provisions was inserted into the text midsentence. Id. The second was inserted in the middle of a 
long excerpt from the Glanvill treatise. Id. The fourth was inserted in a place in the treatise where it contradicts 
the text that comes directly before it. Id. In addition to the evidence from the council of Merton, there are other 
bits of evidence that point to an earlier date of composition. The treatise contains many writs, all but one of 
which have limitation dates that were not in force after 1237. Id. at xxviii. 
 There is evidence that the treatise might date to even earlier than 1236. For example, the treatise states 
that a demandant could bring a writ of novel disseisin not only against the original disseisor but also against 
his heirs. Id. at xxiii. Under later thirteenth-century law, such a demandant would have to bring a writ of entry, 
  
2012] ENGLISH JUDGES AND ROMAN JURISTS 835 
 
was most likely written by a series of authors, beginning with William of Ralegh and 
ending with Henry de Bratton, over a period of forty years.45 More to our purpose, 
Thorne also showed that the Note Book was not the source for most of the cases in the 
treatise, and that the marked rolls were probably not used to make the Note Book.46 The 
Note Book, the marked rolls, and Bracton were all separate projects. 
If these were separate projects, then there were at least half a dozen independent 
collections of cases circulating in the early- to mid-thirteenth century. Where 
Maitland’s narrative hid case collecting behind Bracton, we can see now that case 
collecting was a phenomenon that lasted from the early decades of the thirteenth 
century until at least the 1260s.47 There seem to have been several people, forming a 
circle around Martin of Pattishall and William of Ralegh, who thought that cases were 
important. But, if the clerks and justices of the courts were not making these collections 
in preparation for Bracton, why were they making them? 
Although Bracton has obfuscated the existence of the case collection as an 
independent genre of legal writing, it is a valuable source for understanding how the 
people who were collecting cases read and engaged with them as texts. The case 
collections themselves give us little insight into their purpose. None of the existing 
collections contains any extensive commentary or even an introduction. Bracton, on the 
other hand, is mostly composed of commentary. Although the authors of Bracton 
comment on the role of the case references only briefly, we can learn quite a bit about 
the role the case references played in the treatise from their placement relative to other 
parts of the text and by the ways the authors of the treatise introduce them. Bracton can 
thus serve as a sort of key for understanding how the people who were collecting cases 
in the thirteenth century understood those cases.  
Bracton is particularly useful for decoding the plea roll collections because the 
collections and the treatise were almost certainly made by the same small, but 
important, group of people. As previously noted, the people collecting cases in the first 
half of the thirteenth century focused on the rolls of the justices Martin of Pattishall and 
William of Ralegh.48 Pattishall’s and Ralegh’s rolls would not have been easy to 
access. They would probably have been available only to their clerks and other people 
close to them. We know that one clerk in particular had at least some of their rolls in 
his possession in 1258.49 In that year, Henry de Bratton, Ralegh’s former clerk and by 
 
because novel disseisin could lie only against the original disseisor. Id. at xxiv. Thorne thought that this was 
the rule by 1230 at the latest, meaning that, unless the author of the treatise took a minority view of this matter, 
this part of the treatise was written in the 1220s or earlier. Id. The treatise also gives two opinions on the issue 
of whether a free woman who was married to a villein was barred from suing for her land held in free tenure 
during her husband’s life. Id. at xxvii. Martin of Pattishall changed the earlier law, barring her from bringing 
such a suit, in 1227, hinting that people were working on the treatise before and after 1227, again, assuming 
that that author adopted Pattishall’s view of the matter. Id. 
45. Id. at xxxvi. 
46. Id. at xxxiv–xxxvi.  
47. The Collection titled Casus et Judicia dates from the 1260s. CASUS PLACITORUM AND REPORTS OF 
CASES IN THE KING’S COURTS 1272–1278, at lxxv–lxxxiv (William Huse Dunham, Jr. ed., Selden Soc’y No. 
69, 1952); Brit. Lib. MS Add. 35179, fols. 36–39. 
48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases included in Bracton.  
49. See ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE BEING THE ROLLS OF PLEAS AND ASSIZES FOR LINCOLNSHIRE 
1218–19 AND WORCESTERSHIRE 1221, at xix–xx (Doris Mary Stenton ed., 1934) (indicating that Bratton kept 
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this time a justice himself, was instructed to return Pattishall’s and Ralegh’s rolls to the 
treasury.50 Bratton could not have been the influence behind the case collecting culture, 
since some of the plea roll collections and parts of Bracton were written before he 
began working in the courts; but he does provide us with evidence that the case 
collecting tradition was located in the circle of Martin of Pattishall and William of 
Ralegh.51 If the earliest case collections and the earliest portions of the treatise are 
dated correctly, the project began during Martin of Pattishall’s tenure as chief justice, 
while Ralegh was his senior clerk, continued during Ralegh’s tenure, and was further 
continued by Ralegh’s clerks, who included Henry de Bratton and the future chief 
justice Roger of Thurkilby.52 It was this group of maybe a dozen justices and clerks 
who first thought to collect cases for something other than the bureaucratic facts 
contained in them, and, more than likely, were the individuals who wrote Bracton.  
In Bracton, then, we can start to understand how the clerks and justices engaged 
with these cases; as we shall see, they engaged with them in the same way the civilians 
of their time engaged with the writings of Roman jurists. They show signs that they 
subscribed to the same peculiar notion of authority as the jurists in the schools, and 
they used dialectical reasoning to create new legal knowledge. Bracton thus raises the 
possibility that the most “English” of legal institutions—case law—was not a purely 
English development, but a combination of English administrative practice with civil-
law thought. The common law tradition thus may owe its most recognizable type of 
legal literature to its most important rival: the civilian, or Roman law, tradition. 
B. The Plea Rolls: Unlikely Case Law 
It is rather remarkable that in the thirteenth century English judges began to read, 
write, and copy cases as if they were a didactic literature, particularly in light of 
England’s case tradition at the time: the plea rolls. Plea rolls at the beginning of the 
thirteenth century were administrative records. They did not look much different from 
the pipe rolls—recording payments to and from the Exchequer—or from the somewhat 
later patent or close rolls, which recorded the king’s correspondence.53 There were a 
few fairly standard forms that plea roll entries could take. Entries recording court 
appearances to begin litigation or to appoint an attorney might take up only a few lines. 
We can see some similarities in style among early plea roll entries, as in this fairly 
typical entry from 1199: 
Buckinghamshire—Robert son of David seeks against Lefwine the merchant 
two acres of meadow with appurtenances in Aylesbury, which David the 
father of the aforesaid Robert, as he says, gaged to the aforesaid Lefwine for 
a term which has ended. Alan the son of Lefwine, having been put in his 
 
his rolls from his days as a clerk until they were demanded of him). This is not particularly surprising, since a 
“judge’s personal clerk would naturally have charge of his master’s rolls,” and “[t]here would be nothing 
surprising in his possession of a great many at once.” Id. at xix. 
50. Id. at xx. Leicester Abbey was instructed to return Stephen of Segrave’s rolls at the same time. Id. 
51. Thorne, supra note 24, at xxxi.  
52. TURNER, supra note 6, at 216–17.  
53. M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND, 1066–1307, at 68–69, 92 
(Blackwell Publishers, 2d ed. 1993) (1979). 
  
2012] ENGLISH JUDGES AND ROMAN JURISTS 837 
 
[Lefwine’s] place, seeks the view. Let the view be had. A day is given to him 
from Easter day in one month: Meanwhile let the view be made.54 
This entry combines several elements, which could appear in one entry or several. 
First, we find out where this case arose. The clerk tells us, by way of an abbreviation in 
the margin, that the case comes from Buckinghamshire. Second, the scribe records 
Robert’s claim for relief. He tells us who the parties are: Robert, who seeks the land, 
and Lefwine, who holds it. He tells us how much land—two acres—and what kind of 
land—pasture—the demandant is claiming. Most entries tell us what kind of writ the 
demandant brought to begin the case. This one does not do so explicitly, although we 
can guess from the relatively standard form that it takes that Robert brought a writ of 
right. After the phrase indicating the type of writ, we get a little bit of information 
pertinent to the case. Robert’s father, David, had held the land and had gaged it to 
Lefwine’s father at some point in the past. 
All of that is contained in the first sentence of the entry. The second sentence does 
something slightly different, and could have been included in a second entry if done at 
a later sitting of the court. It tells us that Lefwine’s son, Alan, would be acting in 
Lefwine’s place, as his attorney, and would have the power to bind him. It also tells us 
about the first action Alan took as his father’s representative: he requested that the 
parties view the land in question. The last few clauses tell us about the process the 
judges ordered. They scheduled a day for the case to be heard and ordered that the 
parties view the land before that date. 
The entry is very informative, but it does not look much like an opinion by 
Learned Hand or Oliver Wendell Holmes. Because this is an administrative entry, 
economy is the aesthetic, and much is left implicit. This entry tells us about the parties 
and the law only incidentally to telling us about the mechanics of the case. Why did 
David gage the land to Lefwine? How long ago? What was the term of the gage? How 
long ago did it expire? What steps did Robert take before he came to court to try to 
recover the land? What law is applicable to the case? None of these questions are 
answered in the fifty-three words of the entry. The court is concerned with the bare 
bones of the case and with what it told the parties at the end of it; it is concerned with 
what is going to matter when the court hears the case again. 
III. THE CASES IN BRACTON 
A. Cases and Authority 
Bracton contains 527 references to plea roll entries, often indicating where to find 
the case in the roll itself.55 In this Section, I show that, contrary to what earlier scholars 
have said about the cases, their role in the treatise is as authoritative legal texts. 
 
54. “Buk’.—Robertus filius Davidi petit versus Lefwinum Mercatorem ij. acras prati cum pertinenciis in 
Ailesberi, quas David pater predicti Roberti, ut dicit, invadiavit predicto Lefwino ad terminum qui preteriit: 
Alanus filius Lefwini positus loco ejus petit visum inde. Habeat visum. Dies datus est eis a die Pasche in j. 
mensem: et interim fiat visus.” 1 CURIA REGIS ROLLS OF THE REIGNS OF RICHARD I. AND JOHN, PRESERVED IN 
THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 102 (1922) (translation by author).  
55. See, e.g., 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 346 (referencing “the end of the roll”).  
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Theodore Plucknett tried to explain the role of the cases in light of what he saw as a 
“crisis of authority” in the early common law, that judges and clerks in the royal courts 
were looking for their own equivalent to the decrees of emperors and popes that Roman 
and canon law used as their authorities.56 According to Plucknett, they found their 
equivalent in writs, not in plea roll entries.57 Plucknett believed that the authors of 
Bracton did think of the cases in the treatise as authorities, but, in his opinion, the cases 
in Bracton were “scientific or intellectual authorities” rather than “formal authorities 
binding upon the courts”; meaning by this that, unlike modern judicial opinions, they 
were “useful illustrations but not in themselves sources of law.”58 According to 
Plucknett, the authors placed them in the treatise to show how legal doctrines worked 
in practice, not to bolster the authority of those doctrines.59 
Fredric Cheyette, in an excellent article on custom in thirteenth century law, 
argued that the authors of Bracton were taking a Roman and canon law approach to the 
problem of authority, but he took a different position on how the authors solved that 
problem.60 For Cheyette, custom was the key. Cheyette compared discussions of 
custom in Roman and canon law treatises and in Bracton and made an entirely 
plausible argument that the authors of Bracton structured their theory of authority 
around Roman and canon law doctrines of custom.61 Custom had a force of its own in 
the two laws; there is authority supporting the view that even a papal decretal could not 
override a local custom unless it did so explicitly.62 By custom, though, the canonists 
and civilians did not mean an inchoate set of practices. Custom only obtained legal 
force when some higher authority gave its stamp of approval to that custom.63 When a 
court had spoken on a custom, the court’s judgment proved that the custom existed and, 
at the same time, transformed it into a legal rule.64 Customary law, then, is custom that 
has been approved by the king or pope through his judges.  
Custom was not the primary source of law to the canonists or civilians. The 
primary sources were legislative or juristic: the decrees of popes, emperors and 
councils, and the opinions of the church fathers and important jurists, the texts that 
could be found in the authoritative collections of law such as Justinian’s Codex and 
Digest.65 Cheyette argues that, since English law had no such collections of authority, 
the justices and clerks who wrote Bracton turned to custom to fill in their law; but it 
was the positive-law custom of the schools to which they turned.66 Thus, the cases in 
 
56. T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 24–33 (1958).  
57. Id.  
58. Id. at 59, 80. 
59. See id. at 58–60 (stating that Bracton authors drew on the quality of intellectual authority contained 
in the cases, not any legal formalism). 
60. Fredric L. Cheyette, Custom, Case Law, and Medieval “Constitutionalism”: A Re-examination, 78 
POL. SCI. Q. 362, 379–80 (1963). 
61. Id. at 379–89.  
62. Id. at 379. 
63. Id. at 379–82. Bracton distinguished between local customs and the more important customs of the 
royal court. Id. at 378, 381. 
64. Id. at 379. 
65. See generally id.  
66. Id. at 377–78.  
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Bracton serve to prove custom, which in this case means the customs that have the 
king’s approval. 
At stake in this debate is whether the cases in Bracton are really case law or not. 
Plucknett thought not.67 For Plucknett, the case illustrated a legal point that was fully 
independent of the case itself. For Cheyette, cases were case law.68 They were 
moments when a body empowered by the king breathed life into a custom and made it 
a binding rule. I present a third possibility. The cases in Bracton were indeed case law 
of a sort. The authors of the treatise collected cases because they were thinking like 
civilians and canonists. But they were not using cases because they were statements of 
custom. They were using them because cases were, in the eyes of the clerks of the 
courts, the words of great jurists. The authors of the treatise imagined the royal justice 
as the equivalent of the Roman jurist, a figure they encountered in the Digest, a text 
which recorded the opinions of jurists of the classical period of Roman law.69 The 
authors of Bracton, who we can be certain had legal training in the schools, exported 
this image to the justices they worked with and served. They began to imagine the royal 
justice not as an administrator, but as a jurist. The plea roll entry thus became important 
as a place where the jurist-justice’s words could be found. It was as juristic opinions, 
not as proof of custom or as mere illustrations, that the authors of Bracton engaged 
with plea roll entries. 
B. Authority Words 
It is hard to tell from most of the case references why the Bracton authors chose to 
place those specific citations in their text. A minority of references, though, show us 
that the authors understood the cases in a very different way than either Plucknett or 
Cheyette thought. The problem with Plucknett’s argument in particular is that it is an 
argument from absence. As he sees it, the case references in the treatise need not be 
more than illustrations.70 If there is an example to the contrary, however, where the 
case or the judge can only have been included as an authority, Plucknett’s argument 
from absence is less secure. There are more than a few places in the treatise where the 
authors indicate to us that the case is more authoritative than Plucknett would have us 
believe; that they are indeed the authors’ English equivalent to decretals or, more to the 
point, to the opinions of Roman jurists that we find in the Digest. 
The words that introduce case references are important for understanding the 
ways that the authors and thirteenth-century readers of the treatise would have 
understood those cases. Whereas most of the references leave the relationship between 
case and rule ambiguous, a few show us that the authors of the treatise undoubtedly 
thought that cases were authoritative texts from which general rules could be 
abstracted. Unfortunately, the vast majority of case references are introduced by the 
words ut (as) or sicut (just as), which give us very little to go on when trying to 
 
67. PLUCKNETT, supra note 56, at 80.  
68. See Cheyette, supra note 60, at 379–81 (noting that “Bracton realized that the rules of English law 
were to be found in past judgments” and that “‘custom’ was the proper term for it”).  
69. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 43–44 (1999).  
70. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 56, at 80 (stating that the cases in Bracton are useful but not “sources of 
law”).  
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understand the function served by the cases. For example, one author tells us “[d]ower 
may be constituted not only in lands and tenements acquired but in those to be 
acquired, if they are acquired or fall in during the life of the husband, as [ut] of Easter 
term in the seventh year of king Henry in the county of Somerset, concerning Emma, 
wife of William Dacy.”71 We can break this sentence into two halves, separated by the 
word as (ut). The first half states a general rule and the second names a case decided in 
court. The text tells us that the rule appears in this treatise as it does in Emma’s case. 
But what does that mean? Does the case illustrate the point? Or does it do something 
more? We cannot tell from this entry. Phrases like “matter may be found in,” “there is 
matter in,” “as happened,” and “as is shown” carry little more meaning than the 
ubiquitous ut, implying only that the rule stated above can also be found in a plea roll 
entry.72  
In some instances, though, the authors of the treatise introduce case references 
with normative prescriptions. “Ought” words (from the verb debere) are often used in 
combination with the introduction to the case reference: “And that she ought not to 
have dower can be found in Hilary term in the seventeenth year of King Henry.”73 The 
impression the author gives us here is that the case is not merely an illustration of what 
to do in a particular procedural situation. Rather, the case states a rule that ought to be 
followed. We have a similar situation with, “that this is so you have” or “that this is so 
may be seen,” both of which indicate that there is some normative value behind the 
statement the author has just made and make the plea roll the locus of that normative 
rule.74 The reader is engaged to seek out the text in which the rule or principle resides, 
which will show him that “this is so.”75  
We start to see that the cases must be more than mere illustrations when we move 
on to the very explicit authority words that introduce some of the case references. In 
 
71. “Item constitui potest dos non tantum in terris et tenementis perquisitis, sed etiam perquirendis, si 
perquisita fuerint vel acciderint in vita viri, ut de termino Paschæ anno regis Henrici septimo, comitatu 
Somersetiæ, de Emma quæ fuit uxor Willelmi Dacy.” 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 268 (footnotes omitted).  
72. There are some cases, introduced by phrases like “as was done,” “it was said” (dictum fuit), and “you 
have” (habetis) that tell us something slightly more than the introductory phrases above. E.g., 2 BRACTON, 
supra note 23, at 94, 238; 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 123. All three imply actors in a way that the previous 
examples do not. “As was done” and “it was said” imply that the aforementioned rule comes from the deed or 
speech of someone in the case that follows. “You have” implies a different sort of actor: the reader. It implies 
that there is something in the plea roll to be had that is not to be had in the treatise itself, and that the reader 
may in fact want to have. Apart from giving us some indication that the intended audience of the treatise was 
composed of people who had access to the rolls—judges and clerks in the royal courts—this phrase hints that, 
in the case references, there is something that the treatise does not provide and that might be found outside of 
it. None of these tell us exactly why it is important to know what was done or said or why we would want to 
have the material from the plea rolls. These types of introductory words need not imply any more than that 
cases are illustrations. But they do point, first of all, to the need to know what happened in past cases and, 
secondly, to the importance of reading the plea roll record itself. 
73. “Et quod dotem habere non debeat, inveniri poterit de termino Sancti Hillarii anno regis Henrici 
septimo decimo . . . . ” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 361; see also 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 29, 321, 361, 
403.  
74. “[Q]uod ita sit habetis . . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 371 (emphasis added). “[Q]uod ita sit 
videri . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
75. Id. 
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one case, which we will examine in more detail later,76 a rule is said to be “proved in 
the last eyre of Martin of Pattishall in the county of Suffolk, an assise of mortdancestor 
beginning ‘If Ralph of Wadleysham.’”77 The author of this passage makes the 
relationship between the rule and the case explicit in a way he does not in the entries 
that begin with “ut.”78 He tells us directly that the case proves the rule. This is not an 
isolated case. The author uses the verb probare to connect the rule to the subsequent 
plea roll entry forty-six times in the received text of the treatise, that is, in just under 
nine percent of the entries.79  
Several cases use debere (the ought verb) together with probare to show us that 
the case represents the author’s own view. For instance, in one part of the treatise, the 
author tells us: “And that the warrantor ought to be demanded that it may be known 
what right he has in the two parts, is proved [in the roll] of Michaelmas term in the 
fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth years of king Henry in the county of 
Warwick, [the case] of John the son of Elfric.”80 The author follows this with a brief 
description of the facts of the case, which he ends by saying, “Whereupon it was clear 
(manifesta) that the woman demandant could not have dower, because the heir of her 
husband had no right in the two parts.”81 The author states the rule in ought terms and 
then says that it is proved by the case.82 He then tells us that the result in the case was 
clear. The text gives us every indication that the rule as stated in the case is the correct 
rule. In addition to meaning to prove or to approve, probare could mean to test in 
medieval Latin—particularly in the context of trials by battle and ordeal.83 But if 
probatur means “is tested” in this passage, then the author seems to believe that the test 
had positive results. It is more likely that the word, as the Bracton authors use it, means 
something closer to prove. This comes through even more strongly when we are told 
that it “is proved from the eyre of William of Ralegh” that a person holding land for a 
term of years may vouch the lord to warrant it, “although there may be an argument 
[ratio] to the contrary.”84 The author here seems to doubt the principle the case states, 
because it is contrary to some ratio, which can mean both “argument” and “reason,” 
 
76. See infra note 126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case of Martin of Pattishall.  
77. “Item quod . . . probatur in ultimo itinere Martini de Pateshilla in comitatu Suffolciæ, assisa mortis 
antecessoris, si Radulfus de Wadleghesham.” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 209 (emphasis added).  
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 360 (“[S]ecundum quod probatur in ultimo itinere Martini de 
Pateshilla in comitatu Lincolniæ . . . .”).  
80. “Et quod warantus exigi debet ut sciri possit quid iuris habuerit in duabus partibus, probatur de 
termino Sancti Michælis anno regis Henrici quarto decimo incipiente quinto decimo comitatu Warrewickiæ, 
de Iohanne filio Elfridi . . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 360.  
81. “Et unde ibi manifestum fuit quod mulier petens dotem habere non potuit, quia heres viri sui nihil 
iuris habuit in duabus partibus.” Id. 
82. Id. 
83. 12 D.R. HOWLETT ET AL., DICTIONARY OF MEDIEVAL LATIN FROM BRITISH SOURCES: FASCICULE XI, 
PHI-POS (2008).  
84. “Et quod ille potest qui tenet ad terminum, quamvis ratio se habeat in contrarium, probatur de 
itinere Willelmi de Ralegha in comitatu Warrewickiæ, de quadam Sibilla quæ dotem petiit, circa finem rotuli.” 
4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 193 (footnotes omitted).  
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and yet believes that the case proves the point.85 This would be truly odd if he was 
using the case as a mere illustration of his point.86 The case must, therefore, have some 
authority on its own, apart from the fact that it is reasonable or that it is in line with the 
author’s own opinion; it can help the author overcome his doubts about the rule’s 
rationality. If a case can overcome reason, it must have a strong authoritative power. 
C. Scholasticism and the Dialectic 
Pace Plucknett, we have seen the evidence that the authors of the treatise thought 
that the cases in it were more than mere illustrations. None of the evidence above, 
however, would cut against Cheyette’s thesis that the cases are authorities in the sense 
that they give the royal imprimatur to custom, that is, that they confirm and prove 
custom and, in the process, turn it into binding law.87 The cases in the treatise do not 
read like proof of existing custom, however. The discourses the authors use for talking 
about cases are instead of the kind that scholars in the universities used to talk about 
their authorities: scripture, the words of the Church fathers, the pronouncements of 
popes and emperors, and, most importantly for present purposes, the works of jurists. 
In this Section, I show that the Bracton authors used cases because they had 
adopted civilian attitudes about harmony and authority. The twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries were a time of rapid change in education in Europe; new methods of 
argumentation were being taught in the cathedral schools and, later, in Europe’s first 
universities. Starting in the twelfth century, scholars began to organize knowledge into 
systems that were internally coherent.88 As the foundation of their systems of 
knowledge, scholars looked to ancient texts, to which they ascribed a peculiar type of 
authority. Different texts acquired this authoritative status in different fields. In 
theology, the Bible, obviously, but also the writings of the church fathers and the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard had acquired this status by the early thirteenth century.89 
In canon law, Gratian’s twelfth-century Decretum would become an authority.90 In 
 
85. 2 J.F. NIERMEYER & C. VAN DE KIEFT, MEDIAE LATINITATIS LEXICON MINUS 1151–52 (2d rev. ed. 
2002) (1976); CHARLTON T. LEWIS & CHARLES SHORT, LATIN DICTIONARY 1525–27 (photo. reprint 1966) 
(1879). 
86. We see something similar in an addicio that must have been added by a later author, because it seeks 
to distance itself from the addicio that comes immediately before it. The author of this later addicio claims that 
the principle that is found in the previous addicio is “true according to R. and others. But to the contrary [the 
roll] of Michaelmas term in the second and the beginning of the third years of king Henry son of king John, in 
the county of Kent, [the case] of Matilda daughter of Simon.” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 274 (“Et hæc vera 
sunt secundum R. et alios. Sed contra de termino Sancti Michælis anno regis Henrici filii regis Iohannis 
secundo incipiente tertio comitatu Cantiæ, de Matillide filia Simonis.” (footnotes omitted)). The author’s 
distancing technique—“according to R. and others”—combined with the use of a case to bolster the other 
opinion suggests that the author held the contrary opinion and that the case has some sort of normative value in 
determining what the proper rule should be.  
87. Cheyette, supra note 60, at 379.  
88. CHARLES M. RADDING & WILLIAM W. CLARK, MEDIEVAL ARCHITECTURE, MEDIEVAL LEARNING: 
BUILDERS AND MASTERS IN THE AGE OF ROMANESQUE AND GOTHIC 85 (1992); R.W. SOUTHERN, THE MAKING 
OF THE MIDDLE AGES 204 (1953).  
89. JOHN MARENBON, MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 
213–14 (2007).  
90. ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM 1–2, 191 (2000).  
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Roman law, it was Justinian’s monumental collections: the Institutes, the Codex, and 
especially the Digest.91 Medieval scholars read these works because their authors were 
thought to have had some special light. As A.J. Minnis has pointed out, the scholastic 
idea of authority was circular: “an [authority] was a book worth reading.”92 Through a 
probably less-than-conscious process, the collective community of scholars had 
ascribed worth to particular authors, much in the same way we create and perpetuate 
literary canons today. No one questioned that Justinian was an authority. 
According to the scholars of the thirteenth century, authorities should, ideally, not 
conflict with each other. Jurists in the civil and canon law faculties emphasized the 
harmony of authorities. The book that established canon law as an academic discipline 
in the universities, Gratian’s Decretum, was titled, in full, The Concordance of 
Discordant Canons (Concordia Discordantium Canonum).93 Gratian took seemingly 
contradictory decrees of councils and popes, along with statements of the church 
fathers, and not only placed them beside each other but offered solutions to the 
contradictions.94 Indeed, in the civil law, this kind of thinking about the foundational 
texts that were at the center of legal training—Justinian’s Institutes, Digest, and 
Codex—was aided by the fact that the Digest, the most studied of the three in the 
medieval universities, explicitly said in its prologue that it did not contradict itself: 
Nothing contradictory will claim a place for itself or be found in this book, if 
anyone will examine the reasons for the difference with a subtle mind. But 
something new or secretly placed will be found, which dissolves the 
complaint of dissonance and introduces another nature, fleeing the bounds of 
discord.95  
To see how this system worked, let us look at one case where Gratian, in his 
Decretum, takes several authorities that seem to conflict and creates a harmonious set 
of doctrines out of them. In his thirty-sixth causa, Gratian highlights a major issue in 
the law of marriage: the question of whether the man who commits raptus—an act 
which, at the time, primarily referred to carrying a woman off without her father’s 
permission—can later marry the woman he has abducted. To discuss this issue, Gratian 
lines up a series of authorities interspersed with bits of commentary explaining how 
they relate to each other. In his first string of authorities, Gratian quotes three church 
councils, letters written by the popes Symmachus and Gregory the Great, and the 
writings of Jovinian, all of which say explicitly that the ravisher cannot marry his 
victim.96 One would think that Gratian wants his reader to come to the conclusion that 
 
91. STEIN, supra note 69, at 46.  
92. A.J. MINNIS, MEDIEVAL THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP: SCHOLASTIC LITERARY ATTITUDES IN THE LATER 
MIDDLE AGES 12 (Edward Peters ed., 2d ed. 2010).  
93. GRATIANUS, CONCORDIA DISCORDANTIUM CANONUM (DECRETUM), in CORPUS IURIS CANONICI (E. 
Friedberg ed. 1879); see also JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 47 (1995). 
94. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 93, at 47–48 (noting that Gratian’s purpose was to “reconcile differing 
canonical traditions and prescriptions into an intellectually consistent and unified system”). 
95. “Contrarium autem aliquid in hoc codice positum nullum sibi locum vindicabit nec invenitur, si quis 
subtili animo diversitatis rationes excutiet: sed est aliquid novum inventum vel occulte positum, quod 
dissonantiae querellam dissoluit et aliam naturam inducit discordiae fines effugientem.” DIG. (Justinian, 
Constitutio Tanta, 15) (translation by author).  
96. GRATIANUS, supra note 93, at C.36 q.2 c.1–6.  
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such a marriage is forbidden; but Gratian’s commentary at the end of this string of six 
cases tells a different story. Gratian distinguishes these cases and tells us that they 
apply to a specific circumstance. He contends that, in all of these cases, the marriage 
was forbidden because “the ravisher did not wish to marry the woman he carried off,” 
although there is no textual basis in any of them for this interpretation.97 Gratian thus 
avoids open disagreement with these authorities. He simply tells us that they do not say 
what the reader might, at first glance, think they say: that a ravisher cannot marry the 
woman he abducted. In these cases, he did not want to marry her, and thus he could not 
be forced to. Therefore, the cases are not directly pertinent to the question of whether 
the ravisher can marry the woman he has taken away from her father. 
After these six authorities, Gratian presents another authority without comment—
an authority who seems to represent his opinion. Gratian gives us a quote from Jerome, 
who said that “there are three legitimate marriages written about in scripture,” two of 
which are marriages between a ravisher and his abductee.98 Following this, he presents 
three more texts. The first describes the case where the father consents to the marriage, 
and, in agreement with Jerome, posits that such a marriage is legitimate. Gratian does 
not comment on this text.99 The second, a short text from Ambrose on payments to the 
woman’s father, which says that the couple will remain married, likewise elicits no 
comment from Gratian.100 The third, a text from the Council of Meaux, is more 
troubling for Gratian, and he writes a commentary on it that is longer than the primary 
text.101 The council initially said that if there are any ravisher-ravishee couples who 
have not, at the time of the council, already been wed, they should be separated 
immediately and not be allowed to marry in the future.102 The council then made a 
small concession, holding that such a couple, if they had both done public penance and 
if “age has driven out incontinence,” could marry. The council heavily qualifies its 
permission, however, stating, “in this we have not constituted a rule, but . . . we 
observe what is rather more tolerable,” hardly a ringing endorsement for such a 
marriage.103 The council tells us that the general rule here is that the couple cannot 
marry, with the proviso that under certain special circumstances they can. Gratian turns 
the reasoning of the council on its head, however, when he titles this text, “Licit 
marriages are conceded to the ravisher and the woman carried off after penance,” 
focusing his attention on the limited permission granted in the second half of the text 
rather than on the blanket prohibition in the first half.104 Where the council laid down a 
general rule that such a couple could not marry and a limited set of conditions under 
which they could, Gratian understands the permission to marry as a general rule, and 
the penance requirement as a minor condition placed upon that rule. 
 
97. “His auctoritatibus evidenter datur intellegi, quod raptor in uxorem rapta ducere non valet.” Id. at 
C.3 q.2 post c.6.  
98. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.7. 
99. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.8. 
100. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.9. 
101. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.10. 
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Gratian does not continue his streak of selective reading, however, when he 
arrives at a text from the Council of Aachen, which says explicitly that men who have 
carried off women cannot marry them “although they have afterwards come to 
agreement, or given dower to them, or have accepted marriage with the consent of their 
parents.”105 He does not find a way to reconcile this opinion with Jerome’s. According 
to Gratian, “this authority does not prejudice the authority of Jerome,” though, since 
Jerome’s opinion “depends on the testimony of divine law.”106 Unsure of how to 
reconcile the texts, Gratian takes the easy way out and simply says that the Council of 
Aachen was wrong. 
Brian Tierney uses this passage as an example of a place where Gratian chooses 
one of his authorities over others.107 The medieval law faculties did not follow their 
authorities blindly and did at times feel free to reject certain texts in favor of others, as 
Gratian does here.108 But although Gratian clearly prefers Jerome’s rule and selects it 
over all of the other authorities in this passage, this is not what he tells us he is 
doing.109 Gratian instead tries to convince us that all of these authorities—except, of 
course, the Council of Aachen—come to the same conclusion on the general point that, 
ordinarily, a ravisher may marry the woman he has stolen from her family. If Gratian 
did feel free to choose his rules based on the substance, not the source, he did it in a 
way that showed his respect for the source as an authority. He could not simply say that 
Jerome was right and the other auctoritates were wrong. He instead did his best to 
reconcile them, even when it is fairly obvious to the modern reader that the passages do 
not say what he wanted them to say. 
This process of reconciliation serves an important function in Gratian’s text, 
beyond showing that authorities do not conflict: it creates new knowledge. Gratian 
never tells us explicitly what he thinks the answer is. He clearly thinks that Jerome’s 
opinion is correct, that such a couple can wed, but he does not reject the other texts. 
Rather, he reads them as exceptions or qualifications to the general rule. These ancient 
auctoritates can be made to accord with Jerome and can help us to flesh out what 
Jerome means. The first series of authorities show us that although the ravisher can 
marry the ravishee, he cannot be forced to do so. The Council of Meaux shows us that 
the couple must do penance before they wed. By bringing the texts into harmony with 
each other, Gratian creates new legal rules out of what appeared to be an irreconcilable 
mess of contradictory opinions.110 
Gratian wrote in the mode of reconciliation, the mode in which scholastic lawyers 
were most comfortable, and used it to refine legal rules. Although legal authorities 
could be wrong, scholars in the law faculties strove to find a way in which all of the 
authorities that spoke on a particular point could be right and to thus create a workable 
 
105. Id. at C.36 q.2 c.11. 
106. Id. 
107. Brian Tierney, “Only the Truth has Authority”: The Problem of “Reception” in the Decretists and 
in Johannes de Turrecremata, in LAW, CHURCH, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STEPHAN KUTTNER 69, 
79 (Kenneth Pennington & Robert Somerville eds., 1977).  
108. Id. at 80–81. 
109. Id. at 79.  
110. See STEPHAN G. KUTTNER, HARMONY FROM DISSONANCE: AN INTERPRETATION OF MEDIEVAL 
CANON LAW 10–12 (1960). 
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system of law out of a cacophony of texts. This creation of new knowledge out of old 
authorities was not unique to Gratian. Hand in hand with the scholars’ emphasis on 
harmony was their use of the dialectical method. As early as the 1150s, John of 
Salisbury complained that dialectic was taking over in the schools to the detriment of 
rhetoric and grammar (the other two parts of the trivium, the first round of studies in 
medieval schools).111 Where rhetoric seeks to convince the speaker’s audience to adopt 
the speaker’s own opinions, dialectic seeks to find truth by putting two people with 
differing viewpoints in conversation, with the ultimate goal being a synthesis between 
the two initially divergent viewpoints.112 One of the major teaching methods in the 
universities, the quaestio, pitted apparently contradictory authorities against each other 
and challenged students to reconcile them.113 Medieval scholars thus used dialectical 
reasoning to reconcile the opinions of authorities that seemed to conflict with each 
other and to bring harmony to the system. 
Medieval dialectic used authorities as a starting point. Contrary to popular belief, 
it was not Sir Isaac Newton who first said that we are dwarfs standing on the shoulders 
of giants. It was rather a phrase John of Salisbury attributed to his teacher Bernard of 
Chartres in the twelfth century, and described the twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
attitude toward scholarship.114 The authorities studied by the medieval schoolmen 
constituted the foundation of knowledge, but they were a foundation that could be built 
upon because, as John said, “we can see more and farther than our predecessors, not 
because we have keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne 
aloft on their gigantic stature.”115 By working out the apparent contradictions of the 
fathers, the jurists, or the Bible, medieval scholars were able to see farther and lead 
people to a greater understanding of old knowledge. By positing that the system had to 
be a harmonious whole and resolving the cruxes of apparent conflict, scholars actually 
innovated, creating an interesting dynamic between authority and creativity, just as 
Gratian had done in expounding on the ravisher’s marriage.116 
Dialectical reasoning was not just an epistemological strategy. It was, at the same 
time, a didactic strategy. It was an efficient way to teach because it pointed out the 
problems in a particular field. Peter Abelard, in his Sic et Non (“Yes and No”), for 
instance, juxtaposed snippets of writings from the church fathers that seemed to 
conflict with each other.117 But he also provided students with a guide for using 
dialectical reasoning to reconcile texts with each other so they could use Sic et Non as a 
 
111. JOHN OF SALISBURY, THE METALOGICON OF JOHN OF SALISBURY: A TWELFTH-CENTURY DEFENSE 
OF THE VERBAL AND LOGICAL ARTS OF THE TRIVIUM 93–95 (Daniel D. McGarry trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 
1955) (c. 1159). 
112. Id. at 102. 
113. See MARENBON, supra note 89, at 160. 
114. JOHN OF SALISBURY, supra note 111, at 167.  
115. Id. 
116. SOUTHERN, supra note 88, at 206–07.  
117. PETER ABAILARD, SIC ET NON: A CRITICAL EDITION 89–104 (Blanche B. Boyer & Richard McKeon 
eds., 1977).  
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sort of workbook.118 Peter Lombard likewise wrote his Sentences in order to create a 
shortcut to the major problems in theology.119 His goal was to show where the 
authoritative texts conflicted so that students could find them quickly without spending 
a lifetime poring over volumes of the writings of the fathers, looking for apparent 
contradictions to reconcile.120 Dialectic was a way of getting to the heart of the matter. 
The quintessential product of this type of thirteenth-century thought was the 
summa, a text which sought both to point out the major areas of debate within a field 
and to reconcile the various opinions in order to present the whole of that field’s 
knowledge as a coherent system.121 Its logic assumes that the system of authorities is 
complete and contains everything necessary for any situation that might arise, much as 
the modern civil law code does.122 In fact, the authors of Bracton relied heavily on the 
summae of the Bolognese civilian Azo and called their own work a summa in imitation 
of Azo.123 
D. Cases and Dialectical Reasoning 
There are several case references in Bracton that show that the authors of that 
treatise were thinking like university trained civilians and canonists. They were treating 
cases from the plea rolls—particularly those of Martin of Pattishall and William of 
Ralegh—as authorities and using those authorities as a base on which to build a legal 
system. They used dialectic to reconcile cases to each other and to show that the legal 
system was in harmony. Although the dialectical reasoning in the treatise is not always 
as sophisticated as that in the most learned civil and canon law summae, the authors of 
Bracton, justices and clerks of the royal courts, thought of themselves as using the 
same tools as the people in the universities. 
Bracton’s tractate on the assize of darrein presentment124 contains an addicio125—
which shows signs of being the work of more than one author—that references two 
cases of Martin of Pattishall:  
 
118. See MARENBON, supra note 89, at 160–61 (observing that what Aberlard did with his Sic et Non 
was to work contradictory texts into “debates with discussion,” using this format to build arguments for his 
own “preferred” solution). 
119. PETER LOMBARD, THE SENTENCES, BOOK 1: THE MYSTERY OF THE HOLY TRINITY 3–5 (Giulio 
Silano trans., Pontifical Inst. of Mediaeval Studies 2007) (c. 1158). 
120. Id.; SOUTHERN, supra note 88, at 207–08. 
121. SOUTHERN, supra note 88, at 204–05. 
122. Id. 
123. 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 19, 46; SELDEN SOC., supra note 24, at 2.  
124. Assizes were procedures of proof in the royal courts made by a group of people—called an assize, 
recognition, or, sometimes, a jury—sworn to tell the truth of the matter. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS 
IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 51–53 (1959). Darrein presentment was one of what were 
called the petty assizes. Id. at 330. If two people claimed the right to present a priest to the same church, one of 
the claimants could acquire a writ of darrein presentment from the royal chancery ordering the royal courts to 
look into which of them had made the last presentment to the church. Id. at 330–31. The tractate can be found 
at 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 205–44.  
125. The addiciones are portions of the text that its editors, Woodbine and Thorne, identified, through 
their analysis of the manuscript traditions, as having been added at some point after the exemplar manuscript 
from which all of the existing manuscripts descend was put into its final form. Thorne, supra note 24, at xviii. 
They were then added into some manuscripts of Bracton, sometimes marked with the word addicio and 
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That in the eyre, in all assises . . . an essoin lies, and after the essoin a 
resummons, and after the resummons another essoin of absence on the king’s 
service, provided the essoined person has his warrant by writ of the lord 
king, is proved in the last eyre of Martin of [Pattishall] in the county of 
Suffolk, an assise of mortdancestor beginning ‘If Ralph of Wadleysham.’ 
[But this could well be for this reason, because the tenant was resident 
outside the county and in the service of the lord king.] But the contrary may 
be found in the county of Kent [in the roll] of the eyre of Martin of 
[Pattishall] in the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth years of king 
Henry, in Michaelmas term, that no resummons lies in the eyre.126  
 The addicio starts by telling us how many delaying tactics a litigant being sued by 
an assize can use if he is being sued before the king’s justices in eyre.127 The author 
tells us that one can use an essoin, a resummons, and then a second essoin, and that we 
know this because it “is proved in the last eyre of Martin of [Pattishall] in the county of 
Suffolk, an assise of mortdancestor beginning ‘If Ralph of Wadleysham.’”128 By 
referencing that case as proof, the author signals to us that we know this is the proper 
procedure to follow because it has been handled this way before: the case proves the 
rule. But this was not the only way this type of case had been handled before, and it 
was not even the only way it had been handled by Martin of Pattishall. As the author of 
the addicio tells us, “the contrary may be found in the county of Kent [in the roll] of the 
eyre of Martin of [Pattishall] in the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth years of 
king Henry, in Michaelmas term, that no resummons lies in the eyre.”129 The author 
thus presents us with two contradictory cases. If we are to follow previous practice, 
which case should we choose? 
One of the authors of the treatise tried to solve this problem. He added a second 
addicio between these two cases, which is set in brackets above. Immediately following 
the first of these two cases, this author seeks to explain the reasoning behind the first 
case, telling us that the reason why there was a resummons in the case “could well be . . 
 
sometimes placed in the margin. Id. It is very difficult to date the addiciones, as some of them contain material 
that would have been archaic by the 1230s and others contain materials that could not have been placed in the 
treatise before the 1250s. Id. It is possible that some of them are material that was removed from the treatise 
during the editing process and then put back into the text at a later date and that still others are accretions to the 
text. Id. In this case, we have not only an addicio but an addicio within an addicio, marked off by brackets.  
126. Translated from: 
Item quod in itinere aliquando iacet essonium et post essonium resummonitio et iterum post 
resummonitionem essonium de servitio domini regis, dum tamen essoniatus warantum habeat 
per breve domini regis, præter assisam ultimæ præsentationis, quæ excipitur ex certa causa et 
necessitate in omnibus assisis, probatur in ultimo itinere Martini de Pateshilla in comitatu 
Suffolciæ, assisa mortis antecessoris, si Radulfus de Wadleghesham. Sed hoc bene potuit esse 
hoc ratione, quia tenens forte manens fuit extra comitatum et in servitio domini regis. 
Contrarium tamen inveniri poterit in comitatu Cantiæ de itinere Martini de Pateshilla anno 
regis Henrici undecimo incipiente duodecimo de termino Sancti Michælis quod in itinere nulla 
iacet resummonitio. 
3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 209 (some alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).  
127. The eyre was an itinerant royal court that visited the counties periodically, often to the terror of the 
residents of the counties. HUDSON, supra note 4, at 123–26.  
128. 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 209.  
129. Id. (first alteration in original). 
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. because the tenant was resident outside the county and in the service of the lord king,” 
implying that perhaps the first case cites not a general rule of procedure at the eyre, but 
an exception to that rule.130 In other words, the two cases can be reconciled if we 
accept that there were some peculiar circumstances in the first case. 
This addicio within an addicio was probably written by a different author than the 
one who wrote the initial addicio, which seems to be complete on its own. It is 
clumsily worked into the text, giving us the solution to the problem before it tells us 
what the problem is; it explains how the two cases can be reconciled before we even 
know there is a second case that contradicts the first. We are probably, then, dealing 
with two cases originally added by an author of the 1230s and an explanation of these 
cases added at a later date. This later author seems to have been troubled by the 
inconsistency between the cases. 
We see this again when an author uses a case about dower to prove a point 
slightly different from that in the case. He tells us that, if a woman claiming dower 
from a deceased man proves her marriage to that man in an ecclesiastical court, but “an 
impediment supervenes, such as war or the like, so that the judgment cannot be put into 
effect, and before she comes to the court the tenant dies, in the war perhaps,” she can 
recover against the new tenant.131 The author goes to some pain to put this case in very 
unspecific terms—the impediment is a war, “or the like,” and the tenant dies in the war 
“perhaps”—making it sound like a general rule rather than a case that happened in real 
life.132 He gets very specific, though, when he tells us that this was “as [in the roll] of 
the eyre of the bishop of Durham and Martin of [Pattishall] in the county of York in the 
third year of King Henry, [the case] of Muriel the wife of Hugh de Hammerton,” a case 
for which, unfortunately, there is no surviving record to tell us how closely it conforms 
to the facts presented in the treatise.133 One might suspect that in a case of this kind, 
being heard in the third year of King Henry (1218/1219), a supervening war would 
have been less than theoretical, and that the tenant who was keeping Muriel from her 
dower had been a victim of the war between King John and the barons following the 
issuance of Magna Carta, which had just ended in September of 1217.134 And yet the 
author wants the case to sound very general, as if this fact pattern is the basis of a rule 
that can apply to many different cases. 
The author uses this case to produce an analogy, even if it is not a very profound 
one: “[b]y analogy [per simile] it appears that if a woman claims someone as her 
husband and the decision is in her favour and not appealed, if the man dies before the 
judgment is put into effect she will obtain dower without further proof.”135 The author 
 
130. Id. 
131. “[E]t cum mulier in veniendo sit cum inquisitione versus curiam supervenit impedimentum sicut 
guerra vel huiusmodi, quod iudicium non poterit executioni demandari, et antequam ad curiam pervenerit 
moritur tenens in guerra forte . . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 376.  
132. Id. 
133. “Ut de itinere episcopi Dunelmensis et Martini de Pateshilla in comitatu Eboraci anno regis 
Henrici tertio, de Muriella quæ fuit uxor Hugonis de Havertona.” Id. (first and third alteration in original). 
134. W.L. WARREN, KING JOHN 256 (1978).  
135. “Per simile videtur quod si mulier petat aliquem in virum, et sententia lata fuerit pro muliere et ab 
ea non sit appellatum, si vir moriatur ante executionem iudicii ipsa sine alia probatione dotem obtinebit.” 3 
BRACTON, supra note 23, at 376 (footnotes omitted).  
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essentially restates the case without the supervening impediment, but it is significant 
that the author writes as if he is analogizing from one case to another, per simile, even 
if his analogy seems an obvious observation on the case. The case is not merely a 
specific set of facts, but a rule that can be applied to other cases.136 
We have seen one instance where the authors of the treatise use a case as the 
foundation for a new rule and another where they create a rule in the process of 
reconciling two contradictory cases. We see them using cases as the foundational 
authorities for a system of law. One of the authors shows his concern for the system 
very clearly, in a series of case citations where he tries to reconcile several 
contradictory opinions. This author tells us that when a tenant loses a case brought by 
writ of right by his default he may still correct his default and recover the land “until he 
has so put himself on the grand assise that the four knights have been summoned to 
choose twelve, according to some, and according to others until the twelve have been 
chosen.”137 There is an addicio in the text at this point, the author of which tries, 
without success, to resolve the problem. He is troubled by this contradiction among the 
ancients: “[b]ecause of the disagreement of the ancients [veteres], nothing certain may 
be held as to what ought to be done if the default is made when the four knights have 
been summoned to choose [etc.], since some say one thing and some another.”138 The 
lack of consensus among the ancients makes it impossible to deduce a single legal rule 
from these cases. To try to resolve the problem, the author adduces two cases from the 
rolls, one from the sixteenth year of King Henry and one from the fourth and fifth 
years, each of which “proves” one side.139 For the latter case, he says that “several 
other cases are in accord with this,” perhaps indicating that this case represents the 
stronger of the two opinions, although he falls short of telling the reader that this is the 
rule to follow.140  
This passage shows us that the case’s authority does not come from the date of the 
decision. Later cases do not necessarily trump earlier ones. Otherwise the case from 
King Henry’s sixteenth year would be the controlling doctrine, and the case from the 
fourth and fifth years of Henry, with which many cases were apparently in accord, 
would be irrelevant. The author seems to have some sense that more cases are better, 
since he tells us that many cases are in accord with this earlier case. The fact that the 
case from the fourth and fifth years of Henry represents a trend does not settle the 
matter to the justice’s satisfaction, though. He still thinks that “nothing certain may be 
held” concerning this point of law.141 The author of this passage thus asserts the 
principle that authorities, in this case the royal justices, should be in harmony with each 
other even as he is forced to admit that that the harmony breaks down in this instance. 
 
136. See 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 225 (referencing a case for a principle concerning heirs and then 
citing an additional case for the principle that “what is said of an heir ought to be applied to a successor”).  
137. “[I]ta quod quatuor milites summoniti fuerint ad eligendum duodecim secundum quosdam, et 
secundum alios quousque duodecim electi fuerint.” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 154.  
138. “Propter dissensum vero antiquorum non poterit teneri aliquod certum quid fieri debeat si defalta 
facta fuerit cum quatuor milites sint summoniti ad eligendum, cum quidam dicant sic quidam contrarium.” Id. 
(third alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
139. Id.  
140. “Et ad hoc concordant plures alii casus.” Id.  
141. Id.  
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E. The Justice’s Authority as an Individual 
Bracton, like the texts of the medieval and modern civil law, was a text concerned 
with systematizing the law and working out its apparent contradictions. If Bracton’s 
version of the dialectic and the modern common law share one thing in common, 
however, it is the emphasis on the justice or judge as an individual authority. Where the 
modern civil law emphasizes the system over the individual and the modern common 
law emphasizes the individual over the system, Bracton’s account of English law kept 
the two in balance. 
We have seen that the authors introduced cases in ways that show they were 
authorities. Words like “prove” show us that the authors thought that the relationship 
between text and case references was that of postulate to proof. Additionally, at least 
one of the authors used the dialectical method of the schools to show his reader that 
cases do not conflict.142 Dialectical reasoning arose out of a very particular idea of 
auctoritas that was popular among medieval scholars, a type of auctoritas that was at 
once collective and individual. “The fathers” or “the jurists” were, as a bloc, correct, 
and their statements formed a system of thought that was self contained and internally 
consistent. At the same time, however, each individual father or jurist had his own 
authority, which might make sense only with reference to the body as a whole, but 
which was nevertheless a type of personal auctoritas. In Bracton we find a tension 
between language that emphasizes the justice as an individual and language that 
emphasizes his place among a collective body of justices, the same sort of tension we 
find in Roman and canon law. The case was, on the one hand, an expression of an 
impersonal system of law. But on the other hand it was an expression of the individual 
authority and learning of the justice who decided it. 
Just as most of the cases are hidden behind the uninformative “ut,” most of our 
judges are hidden behind impersonal, passive statements. In most plea roll entries the 
justice hides behind the clerk’s “consideratum est” (it is considered), which tells us 
only that the case has come to some kind of decision, not who made that decision.143 
Less than half of the cases in Bracton—204 out of 527—give the names of the justices 
who sat in the case. More often the authors cite only the term and year of King Henry’s 
reign: “as [in the roll] of Easter term in the seventh year of king Henry in the county of 
Devon.”144 These types of entries were probably useful for readers of the treatise who 
also had access to the rolls. Several such entries include the words “in the roll,” 
suggesting that this whole case reference may be merely a way of referencing a 
 
142. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text for a discussion of an attempt by the authors of one 
of Bracton’s tractates to reconcile two seemingly contradictory cases by framing one case as an exception to 
the rule.  
143. This passive tradition of case law seems to have been part of the culture of the royal courts in 
England and Normandy, since we have collections of cases taken from the rolls of the Norman Exchequer that 
generally begin with “judicatum est” (it was judged). Huntington Library MS 1343, for example, includes a 
collection of cases from the Norman exchequer and a late thirteenth-century copy of the Norman treatise called 
the Summa de Legibus in Curia Laicali, which is also glossed with cases from the exchequer. Most of these 
cases begin with the words “judicatum est.”  
144. “Ut de termino Paschæ anno regis Henrici septimo comitatu Devoniæ.” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, 
at 225 (alteration in original).  
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document, not of ascribing authority.145 Just as 21 U.S. 389 will take you to the 389th 
page of the 21st volume of the United States reporter, “of Easter term in the seventh 
year of king Henry in the county of Devon,” will take you to the appropriate roll to find 
your case.  
We might deduce then that authority comes from the case itself, not from the actor 
behind it. We might go in another direction entirely and say, along with Cheyette, that 
the authors did care about where the authority came from, but that the important part 
was that the point in question had been decided in the king’s court. Who made that 
decision was much less important than the fact that it had been confirmed in the court 
and given the king’s imprimatur. Yet something more active and personal is lurking 
behind these phrases. We should not read too much into the passive construction, for 
instance, because the passive voice was more highly regarded in medieval Latin than it 
is in modern English. We cannot, therefore, assume from the lack of an actor in the 
introduction to the case that the authors did not have one in mind. 
Although the treatise does give us hints that its authors thought of authority as 
being in some way collective, there are also strong indications that they thought of 
authority as individual. Conflict between the justices is apparent at several other points 
in the treatise. The “some say . . . others say” (quidam dicunt . . . alii dicunt) formula 
that appears in so many scholastic texts makes its way into Bracton.146 Sometimes the 
authors resolve these disputes, either with their own solutions or that of some judge.147 
William of York, whose cases, oddly enough, never appear in the treatise, acts as an 
arbiter of law for the author or authors. In one part of the treatise, an author tells us that 
“[i]f the eldest [son] dies in the lifetime of the father, some say that no mention need be 
made of him as though he had never been in existence,” before an addicio intervenes to 
say that this is “according to some, which is not true.”148 A few lines down, another 
addicio informs us that there are others, not just the author, who hold the opposite 
opinion, as “there are some who say, and it is true, that mention must be made of a son 
who has died in the lifetime of his father, the view of William of York.”149 In another 
addicio where the author complicates the primary text by admitting that “so [the rule 
stated above] seems to some, but to others the contrary seems true,”150 he resolves the 
dispute by saying that this new, contrary opinion “was the opinion [ratio] of William of 
York, and it is good [bona].”151  
William of York is not the only justice whose opinion seems to matter on its own. 
Martin of Pattishall—not surprisingly, since his cases are the most frequently 
 
145. 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 52.  
146. See id. at 388, 403, 424, 432. 
147. Id. at 251 (providing an example of a case where the author resolves competing opinions by arguing 
that the latter opinion would create an absurd result).  
148. “Si antenatus in vita patris moriatur, dicunt quidam quod nulla de eo fieri debet mentio, ac si 
numquam esset in rerum natura secundum quosdam, quod non est verum . . . .” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 
173 (footnotes omitted).  
149. “Sed sunt quidam qui dicunt, et verum est, quod de filio mortuo in vita patris oportet facere 
mentionem secundum Willelmum de Eboraco . . . .” Id. 
150. “Ut quibusdam videtur, sed aliis videtur contra . . . .” 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 367.  
151. “Et hæc fuit ratio W. de Eboraco et bona.” Id. See also 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 66 (providing 
an example of a rule that is true “secundum W. de Eboraco”).  
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referenced in the treatise—is featured prominently apart from his cases. One author, 
probably Pattishall’s clerk, William of Ralegh, tells us what Pattishall was accustomed 
to do in certain types of cases. For example, when “boundaries [were] destroyed or 
completely altered the lord Martin took an assise as of a free tenement, not as a 
trespass. For he used to say that one could not commit a more harmful disseisin than by 
destroying boundaries completely, or by moving or removing them.”152 Ralegh uses the 
things Martin used to say and do as sources of authority similar to cases in several 
places in the treatise.153 In another part of the treatise, we are told what “is better, 
according to Martin.”154  
In addition to his cases and sayings, other texts of Martin of Pattishall are quoted 
and referenced in the treatise, apparently as models for what future justices should do. 
His consultations to the ecclesiastical courts on issues of jurisdiction are preserved in 
two places. On one occasion an author signals that Pattishall’s words are authoritative 
and definitive by using the “ought” language often used to introduce cases: “When the 
ordinary has received the letters of the lord king, he ought to proceed to hold the 
inquest in this way, according to the consultation of Martin.”155  
Royal writs occasionally appear in the treatise as the words of royal justices. 
When we do, very occasionally, see writs introduced with authority words of the type 
that the authors use for cases, an individual justice is the driving force behind that 
authority. For instance, when a widower without children is unlawfully holding his 
dead wife’s land against the interests of his wife’s heir—when, in other words, he is 
trying to claim curtsey when no curtsey is due to him—“the heir is aided by the writ 
drawn by William of Ralegh for Ralph of Dodescumbe.”156 A heading introducing a 
writ at another point in the treatise reads, “Writ on the constitution of Merton, which 
was then provided by William Ralegh, then justiciar.”157 Statutes appear only 
occasionally in the treatise. Although statutes in the thirteenth century were written in 
the voice of the king, in the treatise they are often ascribed to judges as well, and can 
even appear in the same format as cases. One heading, very similar to the one 
introducing William of Ralegh’s writ above, reads, “Of the constitution of Merton by 
William of Ralegh, then justiciar.”158 It seems that statutes, like writs and cases, were 
 
152. “Dominus tamen Martinus assisam cepit de divisis corruptis vel mutatis omnino sicut de libero et 
non sicut de transgressione. Dicebat enim quod non potuit quis magis iniuriosam facere disseisinam quam de 
terminis demoliendis omnino vel corrumpendis in parte vel amovendis . . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 
128 (footnotes omitted).  
153. Martin of Pattishall is not the only justice whose “sayings” are recorded. At one point the author of 
an addicio says that a particular doctrine having to do with curtsey “was wrongful according to Stephen of 
Segrave,” and that “[h]e used to say that this law was misunderstood and misapplied.” 4 BRACTON, supra note 
23, at 360 (footnote omitted).  
154. 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 122.  
155. “Ordinarius cum litteras domini regis acceperit secundum consultationem Martini procedere debet 
ad inquisitione faciendam, hoc modo.” Id. at 373 (footnotes omitted).  
156. “[C]onsulitur heredi per tale breve per Willelmum de Ralegha formatum pro Radulfo de 
Dodescumbe . . . .” 4 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 362 (footnotes omitted).  
157. “Breve de constitutione de Mertona secundum quod tunc provisum fuit per Willelmum de Ralegha 
tunc iustitiarium.” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 180.  
158. “De constitutione de Mertona per Willelmum de Ralegha tunc iustitiarium.” Id. at 179.  
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important to the authors of the treatise because they are places where one can find the 
justice’s words. 
The examples above are not cases, but they do show us that the authors of the 
treatise thought that some justices were important as individual authorities, not simply 
as cogs in a legal machine. The authors legitimize the good opinions of the text by 
noting they come from specific justices like William of York and William of Ralegh. 
Martin of Pattishall’s consultations, speeches, acts, and advice served as models for 
future judicial action. Judicial writing, in all its forms, is important to these authors as a 
source of authority.  
If justices can speak as individuals, they can also disagree with each other, and the 
authors of the treatise at times have to rely on the greater individual authority of one 
justice over that of another, as in the case of serjeanties: the treatise authors tells us 
that, since they are not military fees in the same sense as a fee held by knight-service, 
the chief lord has no right to the marriage or wardship of the heir to a serjeanty; 
[b]ut the contrary may be seen [in the case] of an abbess of Barking, among 
the pleas which follow the king in the [seventeenth] year of King Henry 
before William of Ralegh, who recovered the wardship and marriage of the 
heir of one of her tenants who held his tenement [in serjeanty] in the manor 
of Barking by the service of riding with her from manor to manor; [a result] 
Stephen of Segrave did not approve.159  
Here, William of Ralegh, who was most probably deeply involved with one stage of 
the writing of the treatise, is put in opposition to both the author of this passage and to 
Stephen of Segrave, whose opinion lines up with the author’s own. 
Robert of Lexington rarely fares well when he appears in the treatise. At least one 
of the authors must have seen him as something of a dunce among the English 
judiciary, since he is “corrected” twice: Once, when he held that an assize utrum could 
lie in a case involving a cathedral or convent, he was corrected “of Easter term in the 
fifteenth year of the reign of king Henry,” which, although the author does not tell us 
this, was a certification to the bench at Westminster, meaning that he was essentially 
overturned.160 The second time, the hapless Robert ruled that a question of bastardy 
should be sent to the bishop’s court, even though the alleged bastard’s father had 
recognized him as legitimate, “a ruling which was revoked and corrected by [per] 
Martin of Pattishall.”161 Cases like the ones where Ralegh and Pattishall correct 
Lexington give us tantalizing glimpses at what might be hiding behind the impersonal 
ut of all those other cases cited in the treatise. We see, just occasionally, a human being 
proving, correcting, revoking, or denying a principle of law. 
The authors of Bracton thought the cases contained in the plea rolls were 
authorities in the same way medieval scholars understood the words of the jurists in the 
 
159. “Contrarium tamen habetur de quadam abbatissa de Berkinge inter placita quæ sequuntur regem 
anno regis Henrici—coram Willelmo de Ralegha, et quæ recuperavit custodiam et maritagium de herede 
cuiusdam tenentis sui, qui tenebat tenementum suum in manerio de Berkinge per servitium equitandi cum ea 
de manerio in manerium, quod quidem S. de Segrave non approbavit.” 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 113 
(emphasis added) (some alterations in original) (footnote omitted).  
160. 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 331. 
161. “[Q]uod quidem revocatum fuit et correctum per Martinum de Pateshilla.” 4 BRACTON, supra note 
23, at 300.  
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Digest to be authorities. Justices were treated as individuals with authority, just as they 
are in modern common law. But their individual authority was counterbalanced by an 
emphasis on the individual as part of a system, an emphasis they acquired from civil 
law. The justices’ writings could be used as the basis for new knowledge, created 
through dialectical reasoning. The authors of Bracton were the dwarfs standing on the 
shoulders of the giants who had written these cases earlier in the century.  
IV. CASE LAW, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN 
Even if there is something of a debate in the United States right now about 
whether case law is actually very important in modern law, about whether statutes and 
administrative regulations have superseded cases as the place where most legal change 
happens, and whether the case is adapting to look more like the statute and the 
regulation, case law is still undoubtedly the basis of common law culture.162 To the 
American lawyer, common law is a law that grows organically, induced from real-life 
cases, not a law deduced from general principles. This kind of thinking pervades the 
system. It provides common lawyers with one of their primary arguments for the 
superiority of common law over civil law, its main competitor in the world today. Civil 
law, which sees itself as the direct heir to Roman law, places the code, not the case, at 
the center, and makes the judge the servant of the legislator’s will.163 The common 
lawyer usually presents the civil law as too rigid, too bound to the words of a code that, 
despite its claims to be all-encompassing, could not possibly contain a solution for 
every legal issue that could arise.164 The common law, on the other hand, is a flexible 
system that refines itself over time.165 
For example, in Comparative Legal Traditions: Texts, Materials, and Cases, a 
casebook for use in American law classes, there is a definitive split in the way the two 
legal systems are described.166 According to the authors, the defining features of the 
civil law are “a particular interaction in its early formative period among Roman law, 
Germanic and local customs, canon law, the international law merchant, and . . . a 
distinctive response to the break with feudalism and the rise of nation states, as well as 
by the peculiar role it has accorded to legal science.”167 The tone is neither laudatory 
nor condemnatory, although the role the civil law accords to legal science is described 
as “peculiar.”168 But, for the most part, this definition merely describes the common 
features of civil law systems as the authors see them.  
 
162. Justice Scalia, in particular, has argued that case law is now subordinate to statute law and that, as a 
result, the case method should largely be abandoned in favor of teaching methods that focus on statutes. 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 4–10 (1997); Frederick 
Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1455–56 (1995).  
163. LASSER, supra note 1, at 168–74.  
164. Id. 
165. See id. at 28. 
166. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS, AND CASES 
ON THE CIVIL AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRENCH, GERMAN, ENGLISH AND 
EUROPEAN LAW (2d ed. 1994). 
167. Id. at 44. 
168. Id. 
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The authors’ description of the common law, however, strikes an entirely different 
tone: 
 English common law evolved from necessity; the law was rooted in 
centralized administration of William, conqueror at Hastings. A single event, 
the 1066 Norman Conquest, was the progenitor of this tradition, its 
foundation a unique, “unwritten” constitution and the recorded, but orally 
rendered decisions of an extraordinarily gifted and respected judiciary. The 
harmony of a homogeneous society, tested by internal stresses but free of 
foreign invasion for nearly a millennium, aided an orderly development of 
legal institutions. Focusing on the resolution of specific, current issues, 
English law developed insulated from the continental reception of Roman 
law, and the later emphasis on codification. As Pollock has said, English 
laws “grew in rugged exclusiveness, disdaining fellowship with the more 
polished learning of the civilians.”169  
The common law is the “unique” product of “the harmony of a homogeneous society” 
that was “free of foreign invasion,” which allowed it to develop “insulated” (in the 
literal sense) from civil law influence.170 The language here does not merely describe 
an insular, English development, it celebrates it, so that when Pollock’s quote comes in 
at the end to suggest that the civil law was “more polished” than the common law, it 
sounds more like a point of national pride than a real concession to the civil law. 
Common law is a triumphal law, the product of a “conqueror.”171 It is also a flexible, 
pragmatic system developed by “an extraordinarily gifted and respected judiciary,” 
which was concerned with the “resolution of specific, current issues.”172 This 
description highlights the fact that it is judges who move the law forward with special 
attention to the needs of the time. Enter case law. 
So much of the American lawyer’s identity is bound up in the idea that American 
law is based on cases partly because law schools still teach using the case method 
instituted by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard in the late nineteenth century, 
a method that has made its way into popular culture through John Jay Osborn’s novel 
The Paper Chase and the film and television series based on it.173 Even the most 
statute- and regulation-based areas of law, such as administrative law and tax law, are 
generally taught through cases that explain those statutes and regulations.174 The judges 
who write the cases know that they are writing for a larger audience than the parties 
before them. They are writing for their peers on the bench, in the legal profession, and, 
potentially, if they explain a point of law particularly cogently, for first-year law 
 
169. Id. at 438. The two descriptions may very well have been written by different authors and this may 
partially account for the difference in tone. I do not mean to disparage an excellent casebook, only to point out 




173. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691 (1995); JOHN JAY 
OSBORN, THE PAPER CHASE (1970); THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973); The Paper Chase 
(CBS television broadcast, 1978–79, Showtime television broadcast 1983–86).  
174. See, e.g., SANFORD M. GUERIN ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
(7th ed. 2008).  
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students.175 Even if we were to posit that cases are not the major source of law for the 
American common law system, they would still be an important part of the common 
law’s culture. And even if lawyers do not use cases all that much, they think that they 
do, and they think that knowledge of cases is what defines their profession. 
Because of this emphasis on the case as part of common law culture, there has 
been much written about case law and how it operates.176 Many of the models used to 
describe common law reasoning focus on the writing judges do in published opinions. 
Ronald Dworkin, for instance, has likened common law reasoning to a chain novel, in 
which several authors are asked to each write one chapter of a book in succession, so 
that the first author writes the first chapter and then hands it off to the second, who 
must write the second chapter using the first as the basis for his story.177 The second 
author thus has room for creativity, but he is also constrained by what the first author 
has written.178 In Dworkin’s estimation, the second author’s duty is to make the novel 
the best novel it can be given what the first author wrote, not to cast aside what the first 
author wrote and write a better novel. He does this according to the “aesthetic 
hypothesis”: the author writes the new chapter or opinion based on what will make the 
best novel or the best system of law, according to the author’s own view of what is 
best.179 Dworkin’s image does a good job of describing how the relationship between 
change and fidelity to authority can be dynamic in a legal system. His chain novelist is 
an author whose creativity comes into the work in several ways. He must build upon 
what has been written by his forebears and must use his own idea of what makes the 
best system when he does so. But the final product does not come entirely from his 
individual genius; it is the product of a tradition. 
Dworkin’s model presents the common law as an unfolding story told by the 
judge. One might ask, however, if judicial writing is actually the most relevant site 
where legal knowledge is created in the common law. I would suggest that the power of 
Dworkin’s model to explain the way the common law system works is limited by the 
fact that it treats only half of the work we expect cases to do in the American common 
law.  
The case plays two important roles in the Anglo-American common law, and 
those roles, although not completely distinct, are different in some ways. First, as 
Dworkin rightly points out, the case is a vibrant method to effectuate legal change. But 
when we look at this other major site where cases are important to the common law, the 
classroom, we see a different type of dynamic. The didactic and epistemological 
strategies that take place in the law school classroom are just as important to the 
 
175. See Schauer, supra note 162, at 1472.  
176. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2010); 
Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court Uses of Supreme 
Court Decision, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325 (1987); Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses 
of the Concurrence by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 777 (1990); Ryan M. Moore, Comment, I 
Concur! Do I Matter?: Developing a Framework for the Influence of Concurring Opinions, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 
743 (2012).  
177. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 158–62 (1985) [hereinafter MATTER OF PRINCIPLE]; 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–38 (1986) [hereinafter LAW’S EMPIRE].  
178. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 177, at 234.  
179. MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 177, at 149.  
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creation of common law culture as the case law created in the courtroom: judges are, 
after all, formed in this environment. It is also a more democratic space than the 
judicial opinion. Whereas the judicial opinion privileges one particular actor—the 
judge—the law school classroom is a space where professors, future lawyers, and 
future judges use cases to learn the law and, more importantly, to create legal 
knowledge. I would suggest that the types of reasoning that go on in the law school 
classroom can be more usefully modeled by the medieval dialectic than by the chain 
novel. 
The classroom is a space where the opinions produced by judges are refined from 
long documents into short, abstract rules. The process actually begins before the 
student is ever assigned a case to read. As Frederick Schauer has pointed out, 
“appellate opinions are not the primary teaching vehicles in American law schools—
that role is served by severely edited appellate opinions as they appear in 
casebooks.”180 When the student reads the case, she further refines it by abstracting a 
holding, a legal rule, out of it. The case, which may be very long even in its edited 
form, is transformed into a single sentence. The professor then challenges the student 
with hypothetical cases that usually alter the facts of the initial case progressively, by 
small degrees, until it becomes more difficult to justify the application of the holding 
from the present case to the new set of facts. The hypothetical presses beyond the 
bounds of the opinion, to places where the rule that the student and the professor have 
refined from the opinion pushes up against other rules in other cases. It encourages the 
student to try to reconcile competing rules, to distinguish them from each other in 
principled ways, and to decide whether the rule in this case should be applied in a more 
marginal set of facts or whether a competing norm should take over. 
Midway through the semester, the emphasis shifts from refining rules out of cases 
to organizing those rules into a system of knowledge. Around their fall break, law 
students usually begin to work on a different type of legal-literary project: the 
outline.181 This document forces the student to take the rules she has abstracted from 
cases and to organize them into a rational system marked off by sections and 
subsections. In the process, the student makes something that looks more like a civil 
law code, or possibly a medieval summa, than a judicial opinion. Medieval summae 
often came out of the teaching process. Students and teachers at times compiled their 
disputation notes into texts that were meant to circulate as independent texts; Thomas 
Aquinas’s theological text De veritate was simply a classroom disputation that he 
wrote in book form and his Summa Theologiae is a long series of quaestiones.182 In the 
modern American law school, outlines have similarly come to stand on their own as 
literature, but they occupy a very different space than the systematic works of medieval 
law. Lawyers and professors write outlines for commercial consumption, but they are 
not considered high scholarship like their medieval counterparts. Law professors, with 
a few exceptions, tend to regard them as the law school equivalents to CliffsNotes, a 
 
180. Schauer, supra note 162, at 1472.  
181. See John Henry Schlegel, Damn! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 765, 767 (1995) (describing 
how students instinctively turn to outlining to organize the material they learn). Of course, the student might 
also buy a ready-made outline.  
182. MARENBON, supra note 89, at 216–17.  
  
2012] ENGLISH JUDGES AND ROMAN JURISTS 859 
 
shortcut to learning that is no replacement for the hard work of making an outline on 
your own.183 Nevertheless, some future historian of legal education in the early twenty-
first century might argue that their importance is out of proportion to the regard the 
legal academy pays them. As of 1994, Emanuel’s was selling 150,000 study aids per 
year.184 
The American Law Institute has turned the legal outline into a type of text that the 
academy does hold in high regard. The ALI’s restatements of the law were originally 
intended “to present an orderly statement of the general common law of the United 
States.”185 The reporter for the original Restatement of Property, William Draper 
Lewis, expressed his concern that “the ever increasing volume of the decisions of the 
courts, establishing new rules or precedents, and the numerous instances in which the 
decisions are irreconcilable, taken in connection with the growing complication of 
economic and other conditions of modern life, [were] increasing the law’s uncertainty 
and lack of clarity,” a statement worthy of Justinian himself.186 Lewis feared that this 
lack of clarity would “force the abandonment of our common-law system of expressing 
and developing law through judicial application of existing rules to new fact 
combinations and the adoption in its place of rigid legislative codes, unless a new 
factor promoting certainty and clarity can be found.”187 According to Lewis, the very 
thing that makes the common law flexible, its nature as a law that grows organically 
out of the decisions of judges, like Dworkin’s chain novel, also makes it disorganized 
and unmanageable. It was out of fear that the common law was becoming an 
unworkable system and that something needed to be done to harmonize the cacophony 
of competing opinions that the ALI began the process of restating the common law. 
The process was one of harmonization, much like the process we have seen in 
texts like Bracton and Gratian’s Decretum. The resulting restatements look much like 
civil law codes. Indeed, Benjamin Cardozo recognized the similarity between the new 
restatements and the texts of the civil law when he described the new restatements as 
“something less than a code and something more than a treatise.”188 Ironically, in their 
drive to preserve the flexibility of the common law and to prevent the advent of “rigid 
legislative codes,” the ALI created something that looks distinctly code-like.189 Both 
Lewis and Cardozo show their ambivalence to the judge-made and judge-centered rules 
of the common law: the Hurculean judges of Dworkin’s chain novel are absent from 
the restatement, which speaks in a unified voice. Saving the common law, to the ALI, 
meant systematizing and depersonalizing the common law. It bears another 
 
183. See Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of 
Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 642 (1997) (explaining that law professors discourage use of 
purchased outlines). But see Eric E. Johnson, A Populist Manifesto for Learning the Law, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
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184. Sheppard, supra note 183, at 641.  
185. William Draper Lewis, Introduction to RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, at viii–ix (1936).  
186. Id. at ix; see DIG. (Justinian, Constitutio Deo Auctore, proem.) (“We have found, however, the 
whole course of the law, which has descended from the founding of the city and the Romulean times, thus to 
be confused, so that it is stretched out to infinity and is not confined within the capacity of human nature.”). 
187. Lewis, supra note 185, at ix.  
188. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 9 (1924). 
189. Lewis, supra note 185, at ix.  
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resemblance to both the case and to the scholastic disputation: the restatement moves 
law forward. In fact, the reporters often consciously adopt rules that are not currently in 
the majority, but which instead reflect a trend in the jurisprudence that the reporters 
favor.190 
Both the outline and the restatement organize the law; and the restatement, at 
least, pushes the bounds of legal knowledge. The major difference between Dworkin’s 
judge deciding a case and the legal scholar or law student producing a restatement or 
outline is that while Dworkin’s Hurculean judge191 is creating a document that presents 
itself as dynamic and moving law forward, the authors of the latter two documents 
present the law as static. They give us a snapshot of the law at a particular time, 
transformed from real-life cases into abstract rules, which are neatly organized into 
conceptual categories. They support their static structure with references to cases. 
Students include references to cases in their outlines; reporters include discussion of the 
relevant case law along with the abstract rules they have drawn out of that case law. 
The restatement and the student outline are surely designed to fit to some kind of 
aesthetic principle, but the principle operates in a different way than it does in the chain 
of cases, where the judge is tasked to fit his analysis into a line of authority. The 
student outline and the restatement are thus documents that play the kinds of roles the 
scholastic quaestio and summa played in the Middle Ages. They create harmony out of 
authority and, in the process, present us with a different type of dynamic between 
continuity and change in the common law than we would perceive if we focused only 
on the work done by the judge in writing the opinion.192 
Comparing and contrasting the cases in Bracton with these models allows us to 
better understand how the outline, the restatement, and Bracton all work as texts. 
Bracton highlights the individual authority of the justice that would, many centuries 
later, become a hallmark of the common law. It also highlights the systematic nature of 
the law that is still a hallmark of the civil law. Both tendencies are on the surface in the 
text. In the modern American common law, both tendencies exist, but the tendency 
towards systematization is largely buried beneath the image of law as an unfolding 
story told by judges. If we turn away from the positivist discourse about the common 
law that focuses on the authoritative statements of law found in judicial opinions and 
towards the documents created by law students and professors, then the modern 
common law’s modes of knowledge-production-through-writing look a lot more like 
the medieval dialectic than they do like Dworkin’s chain novelist. Scholars in the 
medieval universities put their authorities in opposition to each other in order to push 
the boundaries of authority and create new rules out of old ones. They asked questions 
and, in the process of answering them, organized legal knowledge into a coherent, 
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internally consistent system.193 The student outline and the restatement of law similarly 
use the debates that the case book raises to organize the field into a coherent system. 
The medieval civilian emphasis on the harmony of the system, which was new to 
English law in the thirteenth century, seems to be with us today as well. When we look 
at documents other than cases, Anglo-American common law looks much less insular 
than it does when we focus on the defining feature of common law culture. Common 
law then becomes part of a common, Roman-inspired, Western legal culture.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Case law is culturally important to the common law today. But does it separate the 
common law from the civil law? England’s first case law was inspired by civilian 
thought, and even today the types of epistemological work that are done in common 
law and in civil law are essentially the same. They share a common ancestry in 
medieval scholastic law, which bequeathed to both legal families an emphasis on law 
as a harmonious system of rules and concepts. Medieval scholars talked of their work 
in terms of bringing harmony to the system they had received from antiquity. When 
they reconciled texts, the assumption was that the truths they were drawing forth were 
already latent in the ancient texts, which must form a coherent and harmonious 
system.194 Of course, they created new thought by reconciling certain texts with other 
texts, but the idiom of progress was one of refinement, not of originality. As one might 
expect with a dwarf standing on a giant’s shoulder, the lion’s share of the focus was on 
the giant, not on the dwarf.  
Of course, to say that the differences between common law and civil law 
(medieval and modern) are more in the perception than in the practice does not make 
those differences any less real. The metaphors we use to talk about what we do are 
important. The harmonization that was at the center of medieval scholastic legal texts is 
alive and well, but it is more central to the civil law than it is to the common law 
because of the different emphases present in the two systems. In the modern civil law, 
which adopted the medieval emphasis on harmony and system as its primary textual 
aesthetic, this work takes place in the code—a very privileged space. The 
harmonization, synthesis, and systematization that were the hallmarks of medieval 
scholastic legal texts like Bracton take place in the modern common law, only less 
overtly in the privileged space of the judicial opinion and more so in the largely 
ignored space of the student outline and the more honored, but still peripheral, space of 
the restatement. The fact that common law and civil law do the same type of work in 
different spaces, both physical and literary, is important to the way they develop. 
Mitchel Lasser has shown, for instance, that although the French Cour de Cassation 
and the United States Supreme Court both make formalist and policy-based arguments 
in formulating new legal rules, they do so in very different spaces, and that difference 
affects the arguments themselves.195 
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What looking beyond the cases to the types of texts that common lawyers write 
around cases does show us, though, is that there is a common core to Western legal 
discourse, whether it is in common law or civil law. This discourse assumes that law is 
a system, not merely a collection of rules and commands, and that that system should 
strive towards harmony. In this sense, the medieval dialectic has left its mark on all of 
Western legal thought, and the common law and the civil law are both heirs to the 
medieval Romanist and canonist tradition. 
